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Bostic v. Shaefer 
 
Ruling Below: Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
 
Same-sex couples filed § 1983 action challenging constitutionality of Virginia statutes and 
constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize 
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. The United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia entered summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor and granted injunctive relief. 
State appealed. Plaintiffs in similar class action intervened. 
 
Question Presented: Whether Virginia codes §§ 20-45.2 and 20-45.3, the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment, and any other Virginia law that bars same sex-marriages from other jurisdictions 
(collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws) violate Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
 
Timothy B. BOSTIC; Tony C. London; Carol Schall; Mary Townley,  
Plaintiffs—Appellees, 
Joanne Harris; Jessica Duff; Christy Berghoff; Victoria Kidd, on behalf of themselves and 
all others similarly situated, Intervenors, 
v. 
George E. SHAEFER, III, in his official capacity as the Clerk of Court for Norfolk Circuit 
Court, Defendant—Appellant, 
and 
Janet M. Rainey in her official capacity as State Registrar of Vital Records; Robert F. 
McDonnell, in his official capacity as Governor of Virginia; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, in his 
official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia, Defendants, 
Michéle McQuigg, Intervenor/Defendant. 
 
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit 
 
Decided on July 28, 2014 
 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
 
FLOYD, Circuit Judge: 
Via various state statutes and a state 
constitutional amendment, Virginia prevents 
same-sex couples from marrying and refuses 
to recognize same-sex marriages performed 
elsewhere. Two same-sex couples filed suit 
to challenge the constitutionality of these 
laws, alleging that they violate the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court 
granted the couples' motion for summary 
judgment and enjoined Virginia from 
enforcing the laws. This appeal followed. 
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Because we conclude that Virginia's same-
sex marriage bans impermissibly infringe on 
its citizens' fundamental right to marry, we 
affirm. 
I. 
A. 
This case concerns a series of statutory and 
constitutional mechanisms that Virginia 
employed to prohibit legal recognition for 
same-sex relationships in that state. Virginia 
enacted the first of these laws in 
1975: Virginia Code section 20–45.2, which 
provides that “marriage between persons of 
the same sex is prohibited.” After the 
Supreme Court of Hawaii took steps to 
legalize same-sex marriage in the mid–
1990s, Virginia amended section 20–45.2 to 
specify that “[a]ny marriage entered into by 
persons of the same sex in another state or 
jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in 
Virginia and any contractual rights created 
by such marriage shall be void and 
unenforceable.” In 2004, Virginia added 
civil unions and similar arrangements to the 
list of prohibited same-sex relationships via 
the Affirmation of Marriage Act. 
Virginia's efforts to ban same-sex marriage 
and other legally recognized same-sex 
relationships culminated in the 
Marshall/Newman Amendment to the 
Virginia Constitution: 
That only a union between one man and 
one woman may be a marriage valid in 
or recognized by this Commonwealth 
and its political subdivisions. 
This Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or 
recognize a legal status for relationships 
of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effects of marriage. Nor 
shall this Commonwealth or its political 
subdivisions create or recognize another 
union, partnership, or other legal status 
to which is assigned the rights, benefits, 
obligations, qualities, or effects of 
marriage. 
The Virginia Constitution imposes two 
hurdles that a potential amendment must 
jump before becoming law: the General 
Assembly must approve the amendment in 
two separate legislative sessions, and the 
people must ratify it. The General Assembly 
approved the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment in 2005 and 2006. In November 
2006, Virginia's voters ratified it by a vote 
of fifty-seven percent to forty-three percent. 
In the aggregate, Virginia Code sections 20–
45.2 and 20–45.3 and the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment prohibit same-sex marriage, 
ban other legally recognized same-sex 
relationships, and render same-sex 
marriages performed elsewhere legally 
meaningless under Virginia state law. 
B. 
Same-sex couples Timothy B. Bostic and 
Tony C. London and Carol Schall and Mary 
Townley (collectively, the Plaintiffs) 
brought this lawsuit to challenge the 
constitutionality of Virginia Code sections 
20–45.2 and 20–45.3, the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment, and “any other Virginia law 
that bars same-sex marriage or prohibits the 
State's recognition of otherwise-lawful 
same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions” (collectively, the Virginia 
Marriage Laws). The Plaintiffs claim that 
the “inability to marry or have their 
relationship recognized by the 
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Commonwealth of Virginia with the dignity 
and respect accorded to married opposite-
sex couples has caused them significant 
hardship ... and severe humiliation, 
emotional distress, pain, suffering, 
psychological harm, and stigma.” 
Bostic and London have been in a long-
term, committed relationship with each other 
since 1989 and have lived together for more 
than twenty years. They “desire to marry 
each other under the laws of the 
Commonwealth in order to publicly 
announce their commitment to one another 
and to enjoy the rights, privileges, and 
protections that the State confers on married 
couples.” On July 1, 2013, Bostic and 
London applied for a marriage license from 
the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the City 
of Norfolk. The Clerk denied their 
application because they are both men. 
Schall and Townley are women who have 
been a couple since 1985 and have lived 
together as a family for nearly thirty years. 
They were lawfully married in California in 
2008. In 1998, Townley gave birth to the 
couple's daughter, E. S.-T. Schall and 
Townley identify a host of consequences of 
their inability to marry in Virginia and 
Virginia's refusal to recognize their 
California marriage, including the 
following: 
• Schall could not visit Townley in the 
hospital for several hours when Townley 
was admitted due to pregnancy-related 
complications. 
• Schall cannot legally adopt E. S.-T., which 
forced her to retain an attorney to petition 
for full joint legal and physical custody. 
• Virginia will not list both Schall and 
Townley as E. S.-T.'s parents on her birth 
certificate. 
• Until February 2013, Schall and Townley 
could not cover one another on their 
employer-provided health insurance. 
Townley has been able to cover Schall on 
her insurance since then, but, unlike an 
opposite-sex spouse, Schall must pay state 
income taxes on the benefits she receives. 
• Schall and Townley must pay state taxes 
on benefits paid pursuant to employee 
benefits plans in the event of one of their 
deaths. 
• Schall and Townley cannot file joint state 
income tax returns, which has cost them 
thousands of dollars. 
On July 18, 2013, Bostic and London sued 
former Governor Robert F. McDonnell, 
former Attorney General Kenneth T. 
Cuccinelli, and George E. Schaefer, III, in 
his official capacity as the Clerk for the 
Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk. The 
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended 
Complaint on September 3, 2013. The First 
Amended Complaint added Schall and 
Townley as plaintiffs, removed McDonnell 
and Cuccinelli as defendants, and added 
Janet M. Rainey as a defendant in her 
official capacity as the State Registrar of 
Vital Records. The Plaintiffs allege that the 
Virginia Marriage Laws are facially invalid 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
that Schaefer and Rainey violated 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 by enforcing those laws. 
The parties filed cross-motions for summary 
judgment. The Plaintiffs also requested a 
permanent injunction in connection with 
their motion for summary judgment and 
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moved, in the alternative, for a preliminary 
injunction in the event that the district court 
denied their motion for summary judgment. 
The district court granted a motion by 
Michele McQuigg-the Prince William 
County Clerk of Court-to intervene as a 
defendant on January 21, 2014. Two days 
later, new Attorney General Mark Herring-
as Rainey's counsel-submitted a formal 
change in position and refused to defend the 
Virginia Marriage Laws, although Virginia 
continues to enforce them. McQuigg 
adopted Rainey's prior motion for summary 
judgment and the briefs in support of that 
motion. 
The district court held that the Virginia 
Marriage Laws were unconstitutional on 
February 14, 2014. It therefore denied 
Schaefer's and McQuigg's motions for 
summary judgment and granted the 
Plaintiffs' motion. The district court also 
enjoined Virginia's employees-including 
Rainey and her employees-and Schaefer, 
McQuigg, and their officers, agents, and 
employees from enforcing the Virginia 
Marriage Laws. The court stayed the 
injunction pending our resolution of this 
appeal. 
Rainey, Schaefer, and McQuigg timely 
appealed the district court's decision. We 
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291. On March 10, 2014, we allowed the 
plaintiffs from Harris v. Rainey—a similar 
case pending before Judge Michael 
Urbanski in the Western District of Virginia-
to intervene. Judge Urbanski had previously 
certified that case as a class action on behalf 
of “all same-sex couples in Virginia who 
have not married in another jurisdiction” and 
“all same-sex couples in Virginia who have 
married in another jurisdiction,” excluding 
the Plaintiffs. 
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, 
we consider whether the Plaintiffs possess 
standing to bring their claims. Second, we 
evaluate whether the Supreme Court's 
summary dismissal of a similar lawsuit 
in Baker v. Nelson remains binding. Third, 
we determine which level of constitutional 
scrutiny applies here and test the Virginia 
Marriage Laws using the appropriate 
standard. For purposes of this opinion, we 
adopt the terminology the district court used 
to describe the parties in this case. The 
Plaintiffs, Rainey, and the Harris class are 
the “Opponents” of the Virginia Marriage 
Laws. Schaefer and McQuigg are the 
“Proponents.” 
II. 
Before we turn to the merits of the parties' 
arguments in this case, we consider 
Schaefer's contention that “[t]he trial court 
erred as a matter of law when it found all 
Plaintiffs had standing and asserted claims 
against all Defendants.” We review the 
district court's disposition of cross-motions 
for summary judgment-including its 
determinations regarding standing-de novo, 
viewing the facts in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party. Summary 
judgment is appropriate when “there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and 
the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.” 
To establish standing under Article III of the 
Constitution, a plaintiff must “allege (1) an 
injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the 
520 
 
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and 
that is (3) likely to be redressed by the 
requested relief.” The standing requirement 
applies to each claim that a plaintiff seeks to 
press. Schaefer premises his argument that 
the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their 
claims on the idea that every plaintiff must 
have standing as to every defendant. 
However, the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that “the presence of one party with 
standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill's 
case-or-controversy requirement.” The 
Plaintiffs' claims can therefore survive 
Schaefer's standing challenge as long as one 
couple satisfies the standing requirements 
with respect to each defendant. 
Schaefer serves as the Clerk for the Circuit 
Court for the City of Norfolk. In Virginia, 
circuit court clerks are responsible for 
issuing marriage licenses and filing records 
of marriage. Although Schall and Townley 
did not seek a marriage license from 
Schaefer, the district court found that Bostic 
and London did so and that Schaefer denied 
their request because they are a same-sex 
couple. This license denial constitutes an 
injury for standing purposes. Bostic and 
London can trace this denial to Schaefer's 
enforcement of the allegedly 
unconstitutional Virginia Marriage 
Laws, and declaring those laws 
unconstitutional and enjoining their 
enforcement would redress Bostic and 
London's injuries. Bostic and London 
therefore possess Article III standing with 
respect to Schaefer. We consequently need 
not consider whether Schall and Townley 
have standing to sue Schaefer. 
Rainey-as the Registrar of Vital Records-is 
tasked with developing Virginia's marriage 
license application form and distributing it 
to the circuit court clerks throughout 
Virginia. Neither Schaefer's nor Rainey's 
response to the First Amended Complaint 
disputes its description of Rainey's duties. 
In addition to performing these marriage-
related functions, Rainey develops and 
distributes birth certificate forms, oversees 
the rules relating to birth certificates, and 
furnishes forms relating to adoption so that 
Virginia can collect the information 
necessary to prepare the adopted child's 
birth certificate. 
Rainey's promulgation of a marriage license 
application form that does not allow same-
sex couples to obtain marriage licenses 
resulted in Schaefer's denial of Bostic and 
London's marriage license request. For the 
reasons we describe above, this license 
denial constitutes an injury. Bostic and 
London can trace this injury to Rainey due 
to her role in developing the marriage 
license application form in compliance with 
the Virginia Marriage Laws, and the relief 
they seek would redress their injuries. Bostic 
and London consequently have standing to 
sue Rainey. 
Schall and Townley also possess standing to 
bring their claims against Rainey. They 
satisfy the injury requirement in two ways. 
First, in equal protection cases-such as this 
case—“[w]hen the government erects a 
barrier that makes it more difficult for 
members of one group to obtain a benefit 
than it is for members of another group, .... 
[t]he ‘injury in fact’ ... is the denial of equal 
treatment resulting from the imposition of 
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the barrier[.]” The Virginia Marriage Laws 
erect such a barrier, which prevents same-
sex couples from obtaining the emotional, 
social, and financial benefits that opposite-
sex couples realize upon marriage. Second, 
Schall and Townley allege that they have 
suffered stigmatic injuries due to their 
inability to get married in Virginia and 
Virginia's refusal to recognize their 
California marriage. Stigmatic injury 
stemming from discriminatory treatment is 
sufficient to satisfy standing's injury 
requirement if the plaintiff identifies “some 
concrete interest with respect to which [he 
or she] [is] personally subject to 
discriminatory treatment” and “[t]hat 
interest independently satisf[ies] the 
causation requirement of standing doctrine.” 
Schall and Townley point to several 
concrete ways in which the Virginia 
Marriage Laws have resulted in 
discriminatory treatment. For example, they 
allege that their marital status has hindered 
Schall from visiting Townley in the hospital, 
prevented Schall from adopting E. S.-T.,
 
and 
subjected Schall and Townley to tax burdens 
from which married opposite-sex couples 
are exempt. Because Schall and Townley 
highlight specific, concrete instances of 
discrimination rather than making abstract 
allegations, their stigmatic injuries are 
legally cognizable. 
Schall and Townley's injuries are traceable 
to Rainey's enforcement of the Virginia 
Marriage Laws. Because declaring the 
Virginia Marriage Laws unconstitutional 
and enjoining their enforcement would 
redress Schall and Townley's injuries, they 
satisfy standing doctrine's three 
requirements with respect to Rainey. In sum, 
each of the Plaintiffs has standing as to at 
least one defendant. 
III. 
We now turn to the merits of the Opponents' 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments. We 
begin with the issue of whether the Supreme 
Court's summary dismissal in Baker v. 
Nelson settles this case. Baker came to the 
Supreme Court as an appeal from a 
Minnesota Supreme Court decision, which 
held that a state statute that the court 
interpreted to bar same-sex marriages did 
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due 
Process or Equal Protection Clauses. At the 
time, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 required the 
Supreme Court to accept appeals of state 
supreme court cases involving constitutional 
challenges to state statutes, such as Baker. 
The Court dismissed the appeal in a one-
sentence opinion “for want of a substantial 
federal question.” 
Summary dismissals qualify as “votes on the 
merits of a case.” They therefore “prevent 
lower courts from coming to opposite 
conclusions on the precise issues presented 
and necessarily decided.” However, the fact 
that Baker and the case at hand address the 
same precise issues does not end our 
inquiry. Summary dismissals lose their 
binding force when “doctrinal 
developments” illustrate that the Supreme 
Court no longer views a question as 
unsubstantial, regardless of whether the 
Court explicitly overrules the case. The 
district court determined that doctrinal 
developments stripped Baker of its status as 
binding precedent. Every federal court to 
consider this issue since the Supreme Court 
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decided United States v. Windsor has 
reached the same conclusion. 
Windsor concerned whether section 3 of the 
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
contravened the Constitution's due process 
and equal protection guarantees. Section 3 
defined “marriage” and “spouse” as 
excluding same-sex couples when those 
terms appeared in federal statutes, 
regulations, and directives, rendering legally 
married same-sex couples ineligible for 
myriad federal benefits. When it decided the 
case below, the Second Circuit concluded 
that Baker was no longer precedential over 
the dissent's vigorous arguments to the 
contrary. Despite this dispute, the Supreme 
Court did not discuss Baker in its opinion or 
during oral argument.  
The Supreme Court's willingness to 
decide Windsor without 
mentioning Baker speaks volumes regarding 
whether Baker remains good law. The 
Court's development of its due process and 
equal protection jurisprudence in the four 
decades following Baker is even more 
instructive. On the Due Process 
front, Lawrence v. Texas and Windsor are 
particularly relevant. In Lawrence, the Court 
recognized that the Due Process Clauses of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
“afford constitutional protection to personal 
decisions relating to marriage, procreation, 
contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education.... Persons in a 
homosexual relationship may seek 
autonomy for these purposes, just as 
heterosexual persons do.” These 
considerations led the Court to strike down a 
Texas statute that criminalized same-sex 
sodomy. The Windsor Court based its 
decision to invalidate section 3 of DOMA 
on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process 
Clause. The Court concluded that section 3 
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny 
because “the principal purpose and the 
necessary effect of [section 3] are to demean 
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex 
marriage,” who-like the unmarried same-sex 
couple in Lawrence—have a constitutional 
right to make “moral and sexual choices.” 
These cases firmly position same-sex 
relationships within the ambit of the Due 
Process Clauses' protection. 
The Court has also issued several major 
equal protection decisions since it decided 
Baker. The Court's opinions in Craig v. 
Boren and Frontiero v. Richardson 
identified sex-based classifications as quasi-
suspect, causing them to warrant 
intermediate scrutiny rather than rational 
basis review. Two decades later, in Romer v. 
Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a 
Colorado constitutional amendment that 
prohibited legislative, executive, and judicial 
action aimed at protecting gay, lesbian, and 
bisexual individuals from discrimination. 
The Court concluded that the law violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause because “its sheer breadth 
is so discontinuous with the reasons offered 
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable 
by anything but animus toward the class it 
affects,” causing the law to “lack[ ] a 
rational relationship to legitimate state 
interests.” Finally, the Supreme Court 
couched its decision in Windsor in both due 
process and equal protection terms. These 
cases demonstrate that, since Baker, the 
Court has meaningfully altered the way it 
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views both sex and sexual orientation 
through the equal protection lens. 
In light of the Supreme Court's apparent 
abandonment of Baker and the significant 
doctrinal developments that occurred after 
the Court issued its summary dismissal in 
that case, we decline to view Baker as 
binding precedent and proceed to the meat 
of the Opponents' Fourteenth Amendment 
arguments. 
IV. 
A. 
Our analysis of the Opponents' Fourteenth 
Amendment claims has two components. 
First, we ascertain what level of 
constitutional scrutiny applies: either 
rational basis review or some form of 
heightened scrutiny, such as strict scrutiny. 
Second, we apply the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to determine whether the Virginia 
Marriage Laws pass constitutional muster. 
Under both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses, interference with a 
fundamental right warrants the application 
of strict scrutiny. We therefore begin by 
assessing whether the Virginia Marriage 
Laws infringe on a fundamental right. 
Fundamental rights spring from the 
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of 
individual liberty, which the Supreme Court 
has described as “the right to define one's 
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life.” 
This liberty includes the fundamental right 
to marry. 
The Opponents and Proponents agree that 
marriage is a fundamental right. They 
strongly disagree, however, regarding 
whether that right encompasses the right to 
same-sex marriage.  
Relying on Washington v. Glucksberg, the 
Proponents aver that the district court erred 
by not requiring “a careful description of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest,” which 
they characterize as the right to “marriage to 
another person of the same sex,” not the 
right to marry. In Glucksberg, the Supreme 
Court described the right at issue as “a right 
to commit suicide with another's assistance.” 
The Court declined to categorize this right 
as a new fundamental right because it was 
not, “objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.” The 
Proponents urge us to reject the right to 
same-sex marriage for the same reason. 
We do not dispute that states have refused to 
permit same-sex marriages for most of our 
country's history. However, this fact is 
irrelevant in this case because Glucksberg 's 
analysis applies only when courts consider 
whether to recognize new fundamental 
rights. Because we conclude that the 
fundamental right to marry encompasses the 
right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg 's 
analysis is inapplicable here. 
Over the decades, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated that the right to marry is an 
expansive liberty interest that may stretch to 
accommodate changing societal norms. 
Perhaps most notably, in Loving v. 
Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a 
Virginia law that prohibited white 
individuals from marrying individuals of 
other races. The Court explained that “[t]he 
freedom to marry has long been recognized 
as one of the vital personal rights essential to 
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free 
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men” and that no valid basis justified the 
Virginia law's infringement of that right. 
Subsequently, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the 
Supreme Court considered the 
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that 
required people obligated to pay child 
support to obtain a court order granting 
permission to marry before they could 
receive a marriage license. The statute 
specified that a court should grant 
permission only to applicants who proved 
that they had complied with their child 
support obligations and demonstrated that 
their children were not likely to become 
“public charges.” The Court held that the 
statute impermissibly infringed on the right 
to marry. Finally, in Turner v. Safley, the 
Court determined that a Missouri regulation 
that generally prohibited prison inmates 
from marrying was an unconstitutional 
breach of the right to marry. 
These cases do not define the rights in 
question as “the right to interracial 
marriage,” “the right of people owing child 
support to marry,” and “the right of prison 
inmates to marry.” Instead, they speak of a 
broad right to marry that is not 
circumscribed based on the characteristics of 
the individuals seeking to exercise that right. 
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to 
constrain the right to marry to certain 
subspecies of marriage meshes with its 
conclusion that the right to marry is a matter 
of “freedom of choice” that “resides with the 
individual.” If courts limited the right to 
marry to certain couplings, they would 
effectively create a list of legally preferred 
spouses, rendering the choice of whom to 
marry a hollow choice indeed. 
The Proponents point out that Loving, 
Zablocki, and Turner each involved 
opposite-sex couples. They contend that, 
because the couples in those cases chose to 
enter opposite-sex marriages, we cannot use 
them to conclude that the Supreme Court 
would grant the same level of constitutional 
protection to the choice to marry a person of 
the same sex. However, the Supreme Court's 
decisions in Lawrence and Windsor suggest 
otherwise. In Lawrence, the Court expressly 
refused to narrowly define the right at issue 
as the right of “homosexuals to engage in 
sodomy,” concluding that doing so would 
constitute a “failure to appreciate the extent 
of the liberty at stake.” Just as it has done in 
the right-to-marry arena, the Court identified 
the right at issue in Lawrence as a matter of 
choice, explaining that gay and lesbian 
individuals-like all people—enjoy the right 
to make decisions regarding their personal 
relationships. As we note above, the Court 
reiterated this theme in Windsor, in which it 
based its conclusion that section 3 of 
DOMA was unconstitutional, in part, on that 
provision's disrespect for the “moral and 
sexual choices” that accompany a same-sex 
couple's decision to marry. 
Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the 
choices that individuals make in the context 
of same-sex relationships enjoy the same 
constitutional protection as the choices 
accompanying opposite-sex relationships. 
We therefore have no reason to suspect that 
the Supreme Court would accord the choice 
to marry someone of the same sex any less 
respect than the choice to marry an opposite-
sex individual who is of a different race, 
owes child support, or is 
imprisoned. Accordingly, we decline the 
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Proponents' invitation to characterize the 
right at issue in this case as the right to 
same-sex marriage rather than simply the 
right to marry. 
Of course, “[b]y reaffirming the 
fundamental character of the right to marry, 
we do not mean to suggest that every state 
regulation which relates in any way to the 
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage 
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.” 
Strict scrutiny applies only when laws 
“significantly interfere” with a fundamental 
right. The Virginia Marriage Laws 
unquestionably satisfy this requirement: they 
impede the right to marry by preventing 
same-sex couples from marrying and 
nullifying the legal import of their out-of-
state marriages. Strict scrutiny therefore 
applies in this case. 
B. 
Under strict scrutiny, a law “may be justified 
only by compelling state interests, and must 
be narrowly drawn to express only those 
interests.” The Proponents bear the burden 
of demonstrating that the Virginia Marriage 
Laws satisfy this standard, and they must 
rely on the laws' “actual purpose[s]” rather 
than hypothetical justifications. The 
Proponents contend that five compelling 
interests undergird the Virginia Marriage 
Laws: (1) Virginia's federalism-based 
interest in maintaining control over the 
definition of marriage within its borders, (2) 
the history and tradition of opposite-sex 
marriage, (3) protecting the institution of 
marriage, (4) encouraging responsible 
procreation, and (5) promoting the optimal 
childrearing environment. We discuss each 
of these interests in turn. 
1. Federalism 
The Constitution does not grant the federal 
government any authority over domestic 
relations matters, such as marriage. 
Accordingly, throughout our country's 
history, states have enjoyed the freedom to 
define and regulate marriage as they see fit. 
States' control over marriage laws within 
their borders has resulted in some variation 
among states' requirements. For example, 
West Virginia prohibits first cousins from 
marrying, but the remaining states in this 
Circuit allow first cousin marriage. States' 
power to define and regulate marriage also 
accounts for their differing treatment of 
same-sex couples. 
The Windsor decision rested in part on the 
Supreme Court's respect for states' 
supremacy in the domestic relations 
sphere. The Court recognized that section 3 
of DOMA upset the status quo by robbing 
states of their ability to define marriage. 
Although states could legalize same-sex 
marriage, they could not ensure that the 
incidents, benefits, and obligations of 
marriage would be uniform within their 
borders. However, the Court did not lament 
that section 3 had usurped states' authority 
over marriage due to its desire to safeguard 
federalism. Its concern sprung from section 
3's creation of two classes of married 
couples within states that had legalized 
same-sex marriage: opposite-sex couples, 
whose marriages the federal government 
recognized, and same-sex couples, whose 
marriages the federal government ignored. 
The resulting injury to same-sex couples 
served as the foundation for the Court's 
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conclusion that section 3 violated the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
Citing Windsor, the Proponents urge us to 
view Virginia's federalism-based interest in 
defining marriage as a suitable justification 
for the Virginia Marriage Laws. However, 
Windsor is actually detrimental to their 
position. Although the Court emphasized 
states' traditional authority over marriage, it 
acknowledged that “[s]tate laws defining 
and regulating marriage, of course, must 
respect the constitutional rights of persons.” 
Windsor does not teach us that federalism 
principles can justify depriving individuals 
of their constitutional rights; it 
reiterates Loving 's admonition that the 
states must exercise their authority without 
trampling constitutional guarantees. 
Virginia's federalism-based interest in 
defining marriage therefore cannot justify its 
encroachment on the fundamental right to 
marry. 
The Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action does not change the 
conclusion that Windsor dictates. 
In Schuette, the Court refused to strike down 
a voter-approved state constitutional 
amendment that barred public universities in 
Michigan from using race-based preferences 
as part of their admissions processes. The 
Court declined to closely scrutinize the 
amendment because it was not “used, or ... 
likely to be used, to encourage infliction of 
injury by reason of race.” Instead, the Court 
dwelled on the need to respect the voters' 
policy choice, concluding that “[i]t is 
demeaning to the democratic process to 
presume that the voters are not capable of 
deciding an issue of this sensitivity on 
decent and rational grounds” and the 
judiciary's role was not to “disempower the 
voters from choosing which path to follow.” 
The Proponents emphasize that Virginia's 
voters approved the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment. Like the Michigan amendment 
at issue in Schuette, the Marshall/Newman 
Amendment is the codification of 
Virginians' policy choice in a legal arena 
that is fraught with intense social and 
political debate. Americans' ability to speak 
with their votes is essential to our 
democracy. But the people's will is not an 
independent compelling interest that 
warrants depriving same-sex couples of their 
fundamental right to marry. 
Accordingly, neither Virginia's federalism-
based interest in defining marriage nor our 
respect for the democratic process that 
codified that definition can excuse the 
Virginia Marriage Laws' infringement of the 
right to marry. 
2. History and Tradition 
The Proponents also point to the “history 
and tradition” of opposite-sex marriage as a 
compelling interest that supports the 
Virginia Marriage Laws. The Supreme 
Court has made it clear that, even under 
rational basis review, the “[a]ncient lineage 
of a legal concept does not give it immunity 
from attack.” The closely linked interest of 
promoting moral principles is similarly 
infirm in light of Lawrence: “the fact that 
the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as 
immoral is not a sufficient reason for 
upholding a law prohibiting the practice; 
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neither history nor tradition could save a law 
prohibiting miscegenation from 
constitutional attack.” Preserving the 
historical and traditional status quo is 
therefore not a compelling interest that 
justifies the Virginia Marriage Laws. 
3. Safeguarding the Institution of 
Marriage 
In addition to arguing that history and 
tradition are compelling interests in their 
own rights, the Proponents warn that 
deviating from the tradition of opposite-sex 
marriage will destabilize the institution of 
marriage. The Proponents suggest that 
legalizing same-sex marriage will sever the 
link between marriage and procreation: they 
argue that, if same-sex couples who cannot 
procreate naturally-are allowed to marry, the 
state will sanction the idea that marriage is a 
vehicle for adults' emotional fulfillment, not 
simply a framework for parenthood. 
According to the Proponents, if adults are 
the focal point of marriage, “then no logical 
grounds reinforce stabilizing norms like 
sexual exclusivity, permanence, and 
monogamy,” which exist to benefit children. 
We recognize that, in some cases, we owe 
“substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments” of the Virginia General 
Assembly, for whom the Proponents purport 
to speak. However, even if we view the 
Proponents' theories through rose-colored 
glasses, we conclude that they are 
unfounded for two key reasons. First, the 
Supreme Court rejected the view that 
marriage is about only procreation 
in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which it 
upheld married couples' right not to 
procreate and articulated a view of marriage 
that has nothing to do with children. 
The fact that marriage's stabilizing norms 
have endured in the five decades since the 
Supreme Court made this pronouncement 
weakens the argument that couples remain 
in monogamous marriages only for the sake 
of their offspring. 
Second, the primary support that the 
Proponents offer for their theory is the 
legacy of a wholly unrelated legal change to 
marriage: no-fault divorce. Although no-
fault divorce certainly altered the realities of 
married life by making it easier for couples 
to end their relationships, we have no reason 
to think that legalizing same-sex marriage 
will have a similar destabilizing effect. In 
fact, it is more logical to think that same-sex 
couples want access to marriage so that they 
can take advantage of its hallmarks, 
including faithfulness and permanence, and 
that allowing loving, committed same-sex 
couples to marry and recognizing their out-
of-state marriages will strengthen the 
institution of marriage. We therefore reject 
the Proponents' concerns. 
4. Responsible Procreation 
Next, the Proponents contend that the 
Virginia Marriage Laws' differentiation 
between opposite-sex and same-sex couples 
stems from the fact that unintended 
pregnancies cannot result from same-sex 
unions. By sanctioning only opposite-sex 
marriages, the Virginia Marriage Laws 
“provid[e] stability to the types of 
relationships that result in unplanned 
pregnancies, thereby avoiding or 
diminishing the negative outcomes often 
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associated with unintended children.” The 
Proponents allege that children born to 
unwed parents face a “significant risk” of 
being raised in unstable families, which is 
harmful to their development. Virginia, “of 
course, has a duty of the highest order to 
protect the interests of minor children, 
particularly those of tender years.” 
However, the Virginia Marriage Laws are 
not appropriately tailored to further this 
interest. 
If Virginia sought to ensure responsible 
procreation via the Virginia Marriage Laws, 
the laws are woefully underinclusive. Same-
sex couples are not the only category of 
couples who cannot reproduce accidentally. 
For example, opposite-sex couples cannot 
procreate unintentionally if they include a 
post-menopausal woman or an individual 
with a medical condition that prevents 
unassisted conception. 
The Proponents attempt to downplay the 
similarity between same-sex couples and 
infertile opposite-sex couples in three ways. 
First, they point out that sterile individuals 
could remedy their fertility through future 
medical advances. This potentiality, 
however, does not explain why Virginia 
should treat same-sex and infertile opposite-
sex couples differently during the course of 
the latter group's infertility. Second, the 
Proponents posit that, even if one member of 
a man-woman couple is sterile, the other 
member may not be. They suggest that, 
without marriage's monogamy mandate, this 
fertile individual is more likely to have an 
unintended child with a third party. They 
contend that, due to this possibility, even 
opposite-sex couples who cannot procreate 
need marriage to channel their procreative 
activity in a way that same-sex couples do 
not. The Proponents' argument assumes that 
individuals in same-sex relationships never 
have opposite-sex sexual partners, which is 
simply not the case. Third, the Proponents 
imply that, by marrying, infertile opposite-
sex couples set a positive example for 
couples who can have unintended children, 
thereby encouraging them to marry. We see 
no reason why committed same-sex couples 
cannot serve as similar role models. We 
therefore reject the Proponents' attempts to 
differentiate same-sex couples from other 
couples who cannot procreate 
accidentally. Because same-sex couples and 
infertile opposite-sex couples are similarly 
situated, the Equal Protection Clause 
counsels against treating these groups 
differently. 
Due to the Virginia Marriage Laws' 
underinclusivity, this case resembles City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 
Inc. In City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court 
struck down a city law that required group 
homes for the intellectually disabled to 
obtain a special use permit. The city did not 
impose the same requirement on similar 
structures, such as apartment complexes and 
nursing homes. The Court determined that 
the permit requirement was so 
underinclusive that the city's motivation 
must have “rest[ed] on an irrational 
prejudice,” rendering the law 
unconstitutional. In light of the Virginia 
Marriage Laws' extreme underinclusivity, 
we are forced to draw the same conclusion 
in this case. 
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The Proponents' responsible procreation 
argument falters for another reason as well. 
Strict scrutiny requires that a state's means 
further its compelling interest. Prohibiting 
same-sex couples from marrying and 
ignoring their out-of-state marriages does 
not serve Virginia's goal of preventing out-
of-wedlock births. Although same-sex 
couples cannot procreate accidentally, they 
can and do have children via other methods. 
According to an amicus brief filed by Dr. 
Gary J. Gates, as of the 2010 U.S. Census, 
more than 2500 same-sex couples were 
raising more than 4000 children under the 
age of eighteen in Virginia. The Virginia 
Marriage Laws therefore increase the 
number of children raised by unmarried 
parents. 
The Proponents acknowledge that same-sex 
couples become parents. They contend, 
however, that the state has no interest in 
channeling same-sex couples' procreative 
activities into marriage because same-sex 
couples “bring children into their 
relationship[s] only through intentional 
choice and pre-planned action.” 
Accordingly, “[t]hose couples neither 
advance nor threaten society's public 
purpose for marriage”—stabilizing parental 
relationships for the benefit of children—“in 
the same manner, or to the same degree, that 
sexual relationships between men and 
women do.” 
In support of this argument, the Proponents 
invoke the Supreme Court's decision in 
Johnson v. Robison. Johnson concerned 
educational benefits that the federal 
government granted to military veterans 
who served on active duty. The government 
provided these benefits to encourage 
enlistment and make military service more 
palatable to existing service members. A 
conscientious objector-who refused to serve 
in the military for religious reasons-brought 
suit, contending that the government acted 
unconstitutionally by granting benefits to 
veterans but not conscientious objectors. 
The Court explained that, “[w]hen, as in this 
case, the inclusion of one group promotes a 
legitimate governmental purpose, and the 
addition of other groups would not, we 
cannot say that the statute's classification of 
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is 
invidiously discriminatory.” Because 
offering educational benefits to 
conscientious objectors would not 
incentivize military service, the federal 
government's line-drawing was 
constitutional. The Proponents claim that 
treating opposite-sex couples differently 
from same-sex couples is equally justified 
because the two groups are not similarly 
situated with respect to their procreative 
potential. 
Johnson applied rational basis review, so we 
strongly doubt its applicability to our strict 
scrutiny analysis. In any event, we can 
easily distinguish Johnson from the instant 
case. In Johnson, offering educational 
benefits to veterans who served on active 
duty promoted the government's goal of 
making military service more attractive. 
Extending those benefits to conscientious 
objectors, whose religious beliefs precluded 
military service, did not further that 
objective. By contrast, a stable marital 
relationship is attractive regardless of a 
couple's procreative ability. Allowing 
infertile opposite-sex couples to marry does 
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nothing to further the government's goal of 
channeling procreative conduct into 
marriage. Thus, excluding same-sex couples 
from marriage due to their inability to have 
unintended children makes little 
sense. Johnson therefore does not alter our 
conclusion that barring same-sex couples' 
access to marriage does nothing to further 
Virginia's interest in responsible procreation. 
5. Optimal Childrearing 
We now shift to discussing the merit of the 
final compelling interest that the Proponents 
invoke: optimal childrearing. The 
Proponents aver that “children develop best 
when reared by their married biological 
parents in a stable family unit.” They dwell 
on the importance of “gender-differentiated 
parenting” and argue that sanctioning same-
sex marriage will deprive children of the 
benefit of being raised by a mother and a 
father, who have “distinct parenting styles.” 
In essence, the Proponents argue that the 
Virginia Marriage Laws safeguard children 
by preventing same-sex couples from 
marrying and starting inferior families. 
The Opponents and their amici cast serious 
doubt on the accuracy of the Proponents' 
contentions. For example, as the American 
Psychological Association, American 
Academy of Pediatrics, American 
Psychiatric Association, National 
Association of Social Workers, and Virginia 
Psychological Association (collectively, the 
APA) explain in their amicus brief, “there is 
no scientific evidence that parenting 
effectiveness is related to parental sexual 
orientation,” and “the same factors”—
including family stability, economic 
resources, and the quality of parent-child 
relationships—“are linked to children's 
positive development, whether they are 
raised by heterosexual, lesbian, or gay 
parents.” According to the APA, “the 
parenting abilities of gay men and 
lesbians—and the positive outcomes for 
their children—are not areas where most 
credible scientific researchers disagree,” and 
the contrary studies that the Proponents cite 
“do not reflect the current state of scientific 
knowledge.” In fact, the APA explains that, 
by preventing same-sex couples from 
marrying, the Virginia Marriage Laws 
actually harm the children of same-sex 
couples by stigmatizing their families and 
robbing them of the stability, economic 
security, and togetherness that marriage 
fosters. The Supreme Court reached a 
similar conclusion in Windsor, in which it 
observed that failing to recognize same-sex 
marriages “humiliates tens of thousands of 
children now being raised by same-sex 
couples” and “makes it even more difficult 
for the children to understand the integrity 
and closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives.” 
We find the arguments that the Opponents 
and their amici make on this issue extremely 
persuasive. However, we need not resolve 
this dispute because the Proponents' optimal 
childrearing argument falters for at least two 
other reasons. First, under heightened 
scrutiny, states cannot support a law using 
“overbroad generalizations about the 
different talents, capacities, or preferences 
of” the groups in question. The Proponents' 
statements regarding same-sex couples' 
parenting ability certainly qualify as 
overbroad generalizations. Second, as we 
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explain above, strict scrutiny requires 
congruity between a law's means and its 
end. This congruity is absent here. There is 
absolutely no reason to suspect that 
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying 
and refusing to recognize their out-of-state 
marriages will cause same-sex couples to 
raise fewer children or impel married 
opposite-sex couples to raise more children. 
The Virginia Marriage Laws therefore do 
not further Virginia's interest in channeling 
children into optimal families, even if we 
were to accept the dubious proposition that 
same-sex couples are less capable parents. 
Because the Proponents' arguments are 
based on overbroad generalizations about 
same-sex parents, and because there is no 
link between banning same-sex marriage 
and promoting optimal childrearing, this aim 
cannot support the Virginia Marriage Laws. 
All of the Proponents' justifications for the 
Virginia Marriage Laws therefore fail, and 
the laws cannot survive strict scrutiny. 
V. 
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that 
the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that 
they prevent same-sex couples from 
marrying and prohibit Virginia from 
recognizing same-sex couples' lawful out-
of-state marriages. We therefore affirm the 
district court's grant of the Plaintiffs' motion 
for summary judgment and its decision to 
enjoin enforcement of the Virginia Marriage 
Laws.  
We recognize that same-sex marriage makes 
some people deeply uncomfortable. 
However, inertia and apprehension are not 
legitimate bases for denying same-sex 
couples due process and equal protection of 
the laws. Civil marriage is one of the 
cornerstones of our way of life. It allows 
individuals to celebrate and publicly declare 
their intentions to form lifelong partnerships, 
which provide unparalleled intimacy, 
companionship, emotional support, and 
security. The choice of whether and whom 
to marry is an intensely personal decision 
that alters the course of an individual's life. 
Denying same-sex couples this choice 
prohibits them from participating fully in 
our society, which is precisely the type of 
segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment 
cannot countenance. 
AFFIRMED 
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting: 
To be clear, this case is not about whether 
courts favor or disfavor same-sex marriage, 
or whether States recognizing or declining to 
recognize same-sex marriage have made 
good policy decisions. It is much narrower. 
It is about whether a State's decision not to 
recognize same-sex marriage violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution. Thus, the judicial response 
must be limited to an analysis applying 
established constitutional principles. 
The Commonwealth of Virginia has always 
recognized that “marriage” is based on the 
“mutual agreement of a man and a woman to 
marry each other,” and that a marriage's 
purposes include “establishing a family, the 
continuance of the race, the propagation of 
children, and the general good of society.” 
In recent years, it codified that 
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understanding in several statutes, which also 
explicitly exclude from the definition of 
“marriage” the union of two men or two 
women. Moreover, in 2006 the people of 
Virginia amended the Commonwealth's 
Constitution to define marriage as only 
between “one man and one woman.” 
The plaintiffs, who are in long-term same-
sex relationships, are challenging the 
constitutionality of Virginia's marriage laws 
under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The district 
court sustained their challenge, concluding 
that the plaintiffs have a fundamental 
right to marry each other under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore that any 
regulation of that right is subject to strict 
scrutiny. Concluding that Virginia's 
definition of marriage failed even “to 
display a rational relationship to a legitimate 
purpose and so must be viewed as 
constitutionally infirm,” the court struck 
down Virginia's marriage laws as 
unconstitutional and enjoined their 
enforcement. 
The majority agrees. It concludes that the 
fundamental right to marriage includes a 
right to same-sex marriage and that therefore 
Virginia's marriage laws must be reviewed 
under strict scrutiny. It holds that Virginia 
has failed to advance a compelling state 
interest justifying its definition of marriage 
as between only a man and a woman. In 
reaching this conclusion, however, the 
majority has failed to conduct the necessary 
constitutional analysis. Rather, it has simply 
declared syllogistically that because 
“marriage” is a fundamental right protected 
by the Due Process Clause and “same-sex 
marriage” is a form of marriage, Virginia's 
laws declining to recognize same-sex 
marriage infringe the fundamental right to 
marriage and are therefore unconstitutional. 
Stated more particularly, the majority's 
approach begins with the parties' agreement 
that “marriage” is a fundamental right. From 
there, the majority moves to the proposition 
that “the right to marry is an expansive 
liberty interest,” “that is not circumscribed 
based on the characteristics of the 
individuals seeking to exercise that right.” 
For support, it notes that the Supreme Court 
has struck down state restrictions prohibiting 
interracial marriage; prohibiting prison 
inmates from marrying without special 
approval; and prohibiting persons owing 
child support from marrying. It then 
declares, ipse dixit, that “the fundamental 
right to marry encompasses the right to 
same-sex marriage” and is thus protected by 
the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause. In reaching this conclusion, 
the majority “decline[s] the Proponents' 
invitation to characterize the right at issue in 
this case as the right to same-sex marriage 
rather than simply the right to marry.” And 
in doing so, it explicitly bypasses the 
relevant constitutional analysis required 
by Washington v. Glucksberg, stating that 
a Glucksberg analysis is not necessary 
because no new fundamental right is being 
recognized. 
This analysis is fundamentally flawed 
because it fails to take into account that the 
“marriage” that has long been recognized by 
the Supreme Court as a fundamental right is 
distinct from the newly proposed 
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relationship of a “same-sex marriage.” And 
this failure is even more pronounced by the 
majority's acknowledgment that same-sex 
marriage is a new notion that has not been 
recognized “for most of our country's 
history.” Moreover, the majority fails to 
explain how this new notion became 
incorporated into the traditional definition of 
marriage except by linguistic manipulation. 
Thus, the majority never asks the question 
necessary to finding a fundamental right—
whether same-sex marriage is a right that is 
“deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition” and “implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor 
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.” 
At bottom, in holding that same-sex 
marriage is encompassed by the traditional 
right to marry, the majority avoids the 
necessary constitutional analysis, concluding 
simply and broadly that the fundamental 
“right to marry”—by everyone and to 
anyone—may not be infringed. And it does 
not anticipate or address the problems that 
this approach causes, failing to explain, for 
example, why this broad right to marry, as 
the majority defines it, does not also 
encompass the “right” of a father to marry 
his daughter or the “right” of any person to 
marry multiple partners. 
If the majority were to recognize and 
address the distinction between the two 
relationships—the traditional one and the 
new one—as it must, it would simply be 
unable to reach the conclusion that it has 
reached. 
I respectfully submit that Virginia was well 
within its constitutional authority to adhere 
to its traditional definition of marriage as the 
union of a man and a woman and to exclude 
from that definition the union of two men or 
two women. I would also agree that the U.S. 
Constitution does not prohibit a State from 
defining marriage to include same-sex 
marriage, as many States have done. 
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment 
of the district court and uphold Virginia's 
marriage laws. 
I 
As the majority has observed, state 
recognition of same-sex marriage is a new 
phenomenon. Its history began in the early 
2000s with the recognition in some States of 
civil unions. And the notion of same-sex 
marriage itself first gained traction in 2003, 
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the Commonwealth's 
prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples violated the State's 
Constitution-the first decision holding that 
same-sex couples had a right to marry. In 
2009, Vermont became the first State to 
enact legislation recognizing same-sex 
marriage, and, since then, 11 other States 
and the District of Columbia have also done 
so. Moreover, seven other States currently 
allow same-sex marriage as a result of court 
rulings. This is indeed a recent phenomenon. 
Virginia only recognizes marriage as 
between one man and one woman, and, like 
a majority of States, it has codified this 
view. The bill originally proposing what 
would become § 20–45.3 noted the basis for 
Virginia's legislative decision: 
[H]uman marriage is a consummated 
two in one communion of male and 
female persons made possible by sexual 
differences which are reproductive in 
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type, whether or not they are 
reproductive in effect or motivation. 
This present relationship recognizes the 
equality of male and female persons, 
and antedates recorded history. 
The bill predicted that the recognition of 
same-sex marriage would “radically 
transform the institution of marriage with 
serious and harmful consequences to the 
social order.” Virginia also amended its 
Constitution in 2006 to define marriage as 
only between “one man and one woman” 
and to prohibit “a legal status for 
relationships of unmarried individuals that 
intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effects of marriage.” The 
plaintiffs commenced this action to 
challenge the constitutionality of Virginia's 
marriage laws. 
After the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment, Virginia underwent a 
change in administrations, and the newly 
elected Attorney General of Virginia, Mark 
Herring, filed a notice of a change in his 
office's legal position on behalf of his client, 
defendant Janet Rainey. His notice stated 
that because, in his view, the laws at issue 
were unconstitutional, his office would no 
longer defend them on behalf of Rainey. He 
noted, however, that Rainey would continue 
to enforce the laws until the court's ruling. 
The other officials have continued to defend 
Virginia's marriage laws, and, for 
convenience, I refer to the defendants herein 
as “Virginia .” 
Following a hearing, the district court, by an 
order and memorandum dated February 14, 
2014, granted the plaintiffs' motion for 
summary judgment and denied Virginia's 
cross-motion. The court concluded that 
same-sex partners have a fundamental right 
to marry each other under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus 
requiring that Virginia's marriage laws 
restricting that right be narrowly drawn to 
further a compelling state interest. It 
concluded that the laws did not meet that 
requirement and, indeed, “fail[ed] to display 
a rational relationship to a legitimate 
purpose, and so must be viewed as 
constitutionally infirm under even the least 
onerous level of scrutiny.” Striking down 
Virginia's marriage laws, the court also 
issued an order enjoining their enforcement 
but stayed that order pending appeal. This 
appeal followed. 
II 
The plaintiffs contend that, as same-sex 
partners, they have a fundamental right to 
marry that is protected by the substantive 
component of the Due Process Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution, and that Virginia's laws 
defining marriage as only between a man 
and a woman and excluding same-sex 
marriage infringe on that right. The 
constitutional analysis for adjudging their 
claim is well established. 
The Constitution contains no language 
directly protecting the right to same-sex 
marriage or even traditional marriage. Any 
right to same-sex marriage, therefore, would 
have to be found, through court 
interpretation, as a substantive component of 
the Due Process Clause. 
The substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause only protects “fundamental” 
liberty interests. And the Supreme Court has 
held that liberty interests are only 
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fundamental if they are, “objectively, 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of 
ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty 
nor justice would exist if they were 
sacrificed.’ ” When determining whether 
such a fundamental right exists, a court must 
always make “a ‘careful description’ of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” This 
“careful description” involves characterizing 
the right asserted in its narrowest 
terms. Thus, in Glucksberg, where the Court 
was presented with a due process challenge 
to a state statute banning assisted suicide, 
the Court narrowly characterized the right 
being asserted in the following manner: 
The Court of Appeals stated that 
“[p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to 
be resolved is whether there is a liberty 
interest in determining the time and 
manner of one's death,” or, in other 
words, “[i]s there a right to die?” 
Similarly, respondents assert a “liberty 
to choose how to die” and a right to 
“control of one's final days,” and 
describe the asserted liberty as “the 
right to choose a humane, dignified 
death,” and “the liberty to shape death 
.” As noted above, we have a tradition 
of carefully formulating the interest at 
stake in substantive-due-process 
cases.... The Washington statute at issue 
in this case prohibits “aid[ing] another 
person to attempt suicide,” and, thus, 
the question before us is whether the 
“liberty” specially protected by the Due 
Process Clause includes a right to 
commit suicide which itself includes a 
right to assistance in doing so. 
Under this formulation, because the Virginia 
laws at issue prohibit “marriage between 
persons of the same sex,” “the question 
before us is whether the ‘liberty’ specially 
protected by the Due Process Clause 
includes a right” to same-sex marriage. 
When a fundamental right is so identified, 
then any statute restricting the right is 
subject to strict scrutiny and must be 
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.” Such scrutiny is extremely 
difficult for a law to withstand, and, as such, 
the Supreme Court has noted that courts 
must be extremely cautious in recognizing 
fundamental rights because doing so 
ordinarily removes freedom of choice from 
the hands of the people. 
The plaintiffs in this case, as well as the 
majority, recognize that narrowly defining 
the asserted liberty interest would require 
them to demonstrate a new fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage, which they 
cannot do. Thus, they have made no attempt 
to argue that same-sex marriage is, 
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.” Indeed, they 
have acknowledged that recognition of 
same-sex marriage is a recent development. 
Instead, the plaintiffs and the majority argue 
that the fundamental right to marriage that 
has previously been recognized by the 
Supreme Court is a broad right that should 
apply to the plaintiffs without the need to 
recognize a new fundamental right to same-
sex marriage. They argue that this approach 
is supported by the fact that the Supreme 
Court did not narrowly define the right to 
marriage in its decisions in Loving; 
Turner; or Zablocki. 
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It is true that, in those cases, the Court did 
not recognize new, separate fundamental 
rights to fit the factual circumstances in each 
case. For example, in Loving, the Court did 
not examine whether interracial marriage 
was, objectively, deeply rooted in our 
Nation's history and tradition. But it was not 
required to do so. Each of those cases 
involved a couple asserting a right to enter 
into a traditional marriage of the type that 
has always been recognized since the 
beginning of the Nation-a union between 
one man and one woman. While the context 
for asserting the right varied in each of those 
cases, it varied only in ways irrelevant to the 
concept of marriage. The type of 
relationship sought was always the 
traditional, man-woman relationship to 
which the term “marriage” was theretofore 
always assumed to refer. Thus, none of the 
cases cited by the plaintiffs and relied on by 
the majority involved the assertion of a 
brand new liberty interest. To the contrary, 
they involved the assertion of one of the 
oldest and most fundamental liberty interests 
in our society. 
To now define the previously recognized 
fundamental right to “marriage” as a concept 
that includes the new notion of “same-sex 
marriage” amounts to a dictionary 
jurisprudence, which defines terms as 
convenient to attain an end. 
Because there exist deep, fundamental 
differences between traditional and same-
sex marriage, the plaintiffs and the majority 
err by conflating the two relationships under 
the loosely drawn rubric of “the right to 
marriage.” Rather, to obtain constitutional 
protection, they would have to show that the 
right to same-sex marriage is itself deeply 
rooted in our Nation's history. They have not 
attempted to do so and could not succeed if 
they were so to attempt. 
In an effort to bridge the obvious differences 
between the traditional relationship and the 
new same-sex relationship, the plaintiffs 
argue that the fundamental right to marriage 
“has always been based on, and defined by, 
the constitutional liberty to select the 
partner of one's choice.” They rely heavily 
on Loving to assert this claim. In Loving, the 
Court held that a state regulation restricting 
interracial marriage infringed on the 
fundamental right to marriage. But nowhere 
in Loving did the Court suggest that the 
fundamental right to marry includes the 
unrestricted right to marry whomever one 
chooses, as the plaintiffs claim. 
Indeed, Loving explicitly relied on Skinner 
and Murphy, and both of those cases 
discussed marriage in traditional, 
procreative terms. 
This reading of Loving is fortified by the 
Court's summary dismissal of Baker v. 
Nelson just five years after Loving was 
decided. In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court interpreted a state statute's use of the 
term “marriage” to be one of common usage 
meaning a union “between persons of the 
opposite sex” and thus not including same-
sex marriage. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the case summarily “for want of a 
substantial federal question.” The Court's 
action in context indicates that the Court did 
not view Loving or the cases that preceded it 
as providing a fundamental right to an 
unrestricted choice of marriage partner. 
Otherwise, the state court's decision 
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in Baker would indeed have presented a 
substantial federal question. 
The plaintiffs also largely ignore the 
problem with their position that if the 
fundamental right to marriage is based on 
“the constitutional liberty to select the 
partner of one's choice,” as they contend, 
then that liberty would also extend to 
individuals seeking state recognition of 
other types of relationships that States 
currently restrict, such as polygamous or 
incestuous relationships. Such an extension 
would be a radical shift in our understanding 
of marital relationships. Laws restricting 
polygamy are foundational to the Union 
itself, having been a condition on the 
entrance of Arizona, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, and Utah into statehood. At 
bottom, the fundamental right to marriage 
does not include a right to same-sex 
marriage. Under the Glucksberg analysis 
that we are thus bound to conduct, there is 
no new fundamental right to same-sex 
marriage. Virginia's laws restricting 
marriage to man-woman relationships must 
therefore be upheld if there is any rational 
basis for the laws. 
III 
Under rational-basis review, courts are 
required to give heavy deference to 
legislatures. The standard 
simply requires courts to determine 
whether the classification in question is, 
at a minimum, rationally related to 
legitimate governmental goals. In other 
words, the fit between the enactment 
and the public purposes behind it need 
not be mathematically precise. As long 
as [the legislature] has a reasonable 
basis for adopting the classification, 
which can include “rational speculation 
unsupported by evidence or empirical 
data,” the statute will pass constitutional 
muster. The rational basis standard thus 
embodies an idea critical to the 
continuing vitality of our democracy: 
that courts are not empowered to “sit as 
a superlegislature to judge the wisdom 
or desirability of legislative policy 
determinations.” 
Statutes subject to rational-basis review 
“bear[ ] a strong presumption of 
validity, and those attacking the 
rationality of the legislative 
classification have the burden ‘to 
negative every conceivable basis which 
might support [them].’ ” 
In contending that there is a rational basis 
for its marriage laws, Virginia has 
emphasized that children are born only to 
one man and one woman and that marriage 
provides a family structure by which to 
nourish and raise those children. It claims 
that a biological family is a more stable 
environment, and it renounces any interest 
in encouraging same-sex marriage. It argues 
that the purpose of its marriage laws “is to 
channel the presumptive procreative 
potential of man-woman relationships into 
enduring marital unions so that if any 
children are born, they are more likely to be 
raised in stable family units.” Virginia 
highlights especially marriage's tendency to 
promote stability in the event of unplanned 
pregnancies, asserting that it has “a 
compelling interest in addressing the 
particular concerns associated with the birth 
of unplanned children.... [C]hildren born 
from unplanned pregnancies where their 
mother and father are not married to each 
other are at significant risk of being raised 
538 
 
outside stable family units headed by their 
mother and father jointly.” 
Virginia states that its justifications for 
promoting traditional marriage also explain 
its lack of interest in promoting same-sex 
marriage. It maintains that a traditional 
marriage is “exclusively [an] opposite-sex 
institution ... inextricably linked to 
procreation and biological kinship,” and that 
same-sex marriage prioritizes the emotions 
and sexual attractions of the two partners 
without any necessary link to reproduction. 
It asserts that it has no interest in “licensing 
adults' love.” 
The plaintiffs accept that family stability is a 
legitimate state goal, but they argue that 
licensing same-sex relationships will not 
burden Virginia's achievement of that goal. 
They contend that “there is simply no 
evidence or reason to believe that 
prohibiting gay men and lesbians from 
marrying will increase ‘responsible 
procreation’ among heterosexuals.” 
But this argument does not negate any of the 
rational justifications for Virginia's 
legislation. States are permitted to 
selectively provide benefits to only certain 
groups when providing those same benefits 
to other groups would not further the State's 
ultimate goals.  
The plaintiffs reply that even if this is so, 
such “line-drawing” only makes sense if the 
resources at issue are scarce, justifying the 
State's limited provision of those resources. 
They argue that because “[m]arriage 
licenses ... are not a remotely scarce 
commodity,” the line-drawing done by 
Virginia's marriage laws is irrational. But 
this fundamentally misunderstands the 
nature of marriage benefits. When the 
Commonwealth grants a marriage, it does 
not simply give the couple a piece of paper 
and a title. Rather, it provides a substantial 
subsidy to the married couple—economic 
benefits that, the plaintiffs repeatedly assert, 
are being denied them. For example, married 
couples are permitted to file state income 
taxes jointly, lowering their tax rates. 
Although indirect, such benefits are clearly 
subsidies that come at a cost to the 
Commonwealth. Virginia is willing to 
provide these subsidies because they 
encourage opposite-sex couples to marry, 
which tends to provide children from 
unplanned pregnancies with a more stable 
environment. Under Johnson, the 
Commonwealth is not obligated to similarly 
subsidize same-sex marriages, since doing 
so could not possibly further its interest. 
This is no different from the subsidies 
provided in other cases where the Supreme 
Court has upheld line-drawing, such as 
Medicare benefits or veterans' educational 
benefits. 
As an additional argument, Virginia 
maintains that marriage is a “[c]omplex 
social institution[ ]” with a “set of norms, 
rules, patterns, and expectations that 
powerfully (albeit often unconsciously) 
affect people's choices, actions, and 
perspectives.” It asserts that discarding the 
traditional definition of marriage will have 
far-reaching consequences that cannot easily 
be predicted, including “sever[ing] the 
inherent link between procreation ... and 
marriage ... [and] in turn ... powerfully 
convey [ing] that marriage exists to advance 
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adult desires rather than [to] serv[e] 
children's needs.” 
The plaintiffs agree that changing the 
definition of marriage may have unforeseen 
social effects, but they argue that such 
predictions should not be enough to save 
Virginia's marriage laws because similar 
justifications were rejected 
in Loving. The Loving Court, however, was 
not applying rational-basis review. We are 
on a different footing here. Under rational-
basis review, legislative choices “may be 
based on rational speculation unsupported 
by evidence or empirical data.” “Sound 
policymaking often requires legislators to 
forecast future events and to anticipate the 
likely impact of these events based on 
deductions and inferences for which 
complete empirical support may be 
unavailable.” And the legislature “is far 
better equipped than the judiciary” to make 
these evaluations and ultimately decide on a 
course of action based on its predictions. In 
enacting its marriage laws, Virginia 
predicted that changing the definition of 
marriage would have a negative effect on 
children and on the family structure. 
Although other States do not share those 
concerns, such evaluations were nonetheless 
squarely within the province of the 
Commonwealth's legislature and its citizens, 
who voted to amend Virginia's Constitution 
in 2006. 
Virginia has undoubtedly articulated 
sufficient rational bases for its marriage 
laws, and I would find that those bases 
constitutionally justify the laws. Those laws 
are grounded on the biological connection of 
men and women; the potential for their 
having children; the family order needed in 
raising children; and, on a larger scale, the 
political order resulting from stable family 
units. Moreover, I would add that the 
traditional marriage relationship encourages 
a family structure that is intergenerational, 
giving children not only a structure in which 
to be raised but also an identity and a strong 
relational context. The marriage of a man 
and a woman thus rationally promotes a 
correlation between biological order and 
political order. Because Virginia's marriage 
laws are rationally related to its legitimate 
purposes, they withstand rational-basis 
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. 
IV 
The majority does not substantively address 
the plaintiffs' second argument—that 
Virginia's marriage laws invidiously 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation, in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause—since it finds that the 
laws infringe on the plaintiffs' fundamental 
right to marriage. But because I find no 
fundamental right is infringed by the laws, I 
also address discrimination under the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
The Equal Protection Clause, which forbids 
any State from “deny[ing] to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws,” prohibits invidious discrimination 
among classes of persons. Any laws based 
on “suspect” classifications are subject to 
strict scrutiny. In a similar vein, 
classifications based on gender are 
“quasisuspect” and call for “intermediate 
scrutiny” because they “frequently bear[ ] no 
relation to ability to perform or contribute to 
society” and thus “generally provide[ ] no 
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sensible ground for differential treatment .” 
Laws subject to intermediate scrutiny must 
be substantially related to an important 
government objective. 
But when a regulation adversely affects 
members of a class that is not suspect or 
quasi-suspect, the regulation is “presumed to 
be valid and will be sustained if the 
classification drawn by the statute 
is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interest.”  Moreover, the Supreme Court has 
made it clear that 
where individuals in the group affected 
by a law have distinguishing 
characteristics relevant to interests the 
State has the authority to implement, the 
courts have been very reluctant, as they 
should be in our federal system and 
with our respect for the separation of 
powers, to closely scrutinize legislative 
choices as to whether, how, and to what 
extent those interests should be pursued. 
In such cases, the Equal Protection 
Clause requires only a rational means to 
serve a legitimate end. 
This is based on the understanding that 
“equal protection of the laws must coexist 
with the practical necessity that most 
legislation classifies for one purpose or 
another, with resulting disadvantage to 
various groups or persons.” 
The plaintiffs contend that Virginia's 
marriage laws should be subjected to some 
level of heightened scrutiny because they 
discriminate on the basis of sexual 
orientation. Yet they concede that neither 
the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit 
has ever applied heightened scrutiny to a 
classification based on sexual orientation. 
They urge this court to do so for the first 
time. Governing precedent, however, 
counsels otherwise. 
And the Supreme Court made no change as 
to the appropriate level of scrutiny in its 
more recent decision in Windsor, which held 
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act 
unconstitutional. The Court was presented 
an opportunity to alter the Romer standard 
but did not do so. Although it did not state 
the level of scrutiny being applied, it did 
explicitly rely on rational-basis cases 
like Romer and Department of Agriculture v. 
Moreno. In his dissenting opinion 
in Windsor, Justice Scalia thus noted, “As 
nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees [that 
rational-basis review applies]; its opinion 
does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central 
propositions are taken from rational-basis 
cases like Moreno.” 
Finally, we have concluded that rational-
basis review applies to classifications based 
on sexual orientation. In Veney, a prisoner 
filed a § 1983 action alleging that he had 
been discriminated against on the basis of 
sexual preference and gender. We noted that 
the plaintiff “[did] not allege that he [was] a 
member of a suspect class. Rather, he 
claim[ed] that he ha[d] been discriminated 
against on the basis of sexual preference and 
gender.” Outside the prison context, the 
former is subject to rational basis review. 
The vast majority of other courts of appeals 
have reached the same conclusion. 
Thus, following Supreme Court and Fourth 
Circuit precedent, I would hold that 
Virginia's marriage laws are subject to 
rational-basis review. Applying that 
standard, I conclude that there is a rational 
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basis for the laws, as explained in Part III, 
above.  
V 
Whether to recognize same-sex marriage is 
an ongoing and highly engaged political 
debate taking place across the Nation, and 
the States are divided on the issue. The 
majority of courts have struck down statutes 
that deny recognition of same-sex marriage, 
doing so almost exclusively on the idea that 
same-sex marriage is encompassed by the 
fundamental right to marry that is protected 
by the Due Process Clause. While I express 
no viewpoint on the merits of the policy 
debate, I do strongly disagree with the 
assertion that same-sex marriage is subject 
to the same constitutional protections as the 
traditional right to marry. 
Because there is no fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage and there are rational 
reasons for not recognizing it, just as there 
are rational reasons for recognizing it, I 
conclude that we, in the Third Branch, must 
allow the States to enact legislation on the 
subject in accordance with their political 
processes. The U.S. Constitution does not, in 
my judgment, restrict the States' policy 
choices on this issue. If given the choice, 
some States will surely recognize same-sex 
marriage and some will surely not. But that 
is, to be sure, the beauty of federalism. 
I would reverse the district court's judgment 
and defer to Virginia's political choice in 
defining marriage as only between one man 
and one woman. 
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LUCERO, Circuit Judge. 
Our commitment as Americans to the 
principles of liberty, due process of law, and 
equal protection of the laws is made live by 
our adherence to the Constitution of the 
United States of America. Historical 
challenges to these principles ultimately 
culminated in the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment nearly one-and-a-half centuries 
ago. This Amendment extends the 
guarantees of due process and equal 
protection to every person in every State of 
the Union. Those very principles are at issue 
yet again in this marriage equality appeal 
brought to us by the Governor and Attorney 
General of the State of Utah from an adverse 
ruling of the district court. 
We are told that because they felt threatened 
by state-court opinions allowing same-sex 
marriage, Utah legislators and—by 
legislature—initiated action—the citizens of 
the State of Utah amended their statutes and 
state constitution in 2004 to ensure that the 
State “will not recognize, enforce, or give 
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legal effect to any law” that provides 
“substantially equivalent” benefits to a 
marriage between two persons of the same 
sex as are allowed for two persons of the 
opposite sex. These laws were also intended 
to assure non-recognition irrespective of 
how such a domestic union might be 
denominated, or where it may have been 
performed.  Plaintiffs challenged the 
constitutionality of these laws and the 
district court agreed with their position. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we entertain the 
appeal of that ruling. 
Our Circuit has not previously considered 
the validity of same-sex marriage bans. 
When the seed of that question was initially 
presented to the United States Supreme 
Court in 1972, the Court did not consider the 
matter of such substantial moment as to 
present a justiciable federal question. Since 
that date, the seed has grown, however. Last 
year the Court entertained the federal aspect 
of the issue in striking down § 3 of the 
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), yet 
left open the question presented to us now in 
full bloom: May a State of the Union 
constitutionally deny a citizen the benefit or 
protection of the laws of the State based 
solely upon the sex of the person that citizen 
chooses to marry? 
I 
Utah residents Derek Kitchen and Moudi 
Sbeity have been in a loving, committed 
relationship for several years. The couple 
lives together in Salt Lake City, where they 
jointly own and operate a business. Kitchen 
declares that Sbeity “is the man with whom I 
have fallen in love, the man I want to marry, 
and the man with whom I want to spend the 
rest of my life.” In March 2013, Kitchen and 
Sbeity applied for a marriage license from 
the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, but 
were denied because they are both 
men. Being excluded from the institution of 
marriage has caused Kitchen and Sbeity to 
undertake a burdensome process of drawing 
up wills and other legal documents to enable 
them to make important decisions for each 
other. Even with these protections, however, 
the couple cannot access various benefits of 
marriage, including the ability to file joint 
state tax returns and hold marital property. 
Sbeity also states that the legal documents 
the couple have obtained “do not and cannot 
provide the dignity, respect, and esteem” of 
marriage. The inability to “dignify [his] 
relationship” though marriage, Kitchen 
explains, communicates to him that his 
relationship with Sbeity is unworthy of 
“respect, equal treatment, and social 
recognition.” 
Laurie Wood and Kody Partridge are also 
Utah residents who wish to “confirm [their] 
life commitment and love” through 
marriage. They applied for a marriage 
license from the Salt Lake County Clerk's 
office in March 2013, but were denied 
because they are both women. This denial 
made Wood “feel like a second class 
citizen.” The couple's inability to marry 
carries financial consequences. Because 
Partridge will be unable to obtain benefits 
under Wood's pension, the couple has 
procured additional life insurance policies. 
Partridge states that she and Wood face 
“risks and stigmas that none of [her] 
heterosexual married friends and family ever 
have to face.” She points to the example of 
her parents, who were married for fifty-five 
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years, observing that her father never had to 
worry about his ability to be present or make 
medical decisions when his wife became 
terminally ill. Wood hopes that marriage to 
Partridge will allow “both society and our 
families [to] recognize the life commitment 
and love we feel for each other.” 
Karen Archer and Kate Call are also Utah 
residents in a loving, committed 
relationship. Archer, who suffers from 
chronic health problems, fears that the legal 
documents the couple has prepared will be 
subject to challenge if she passes away. Her 
past experience surviving other partners 
informs this fear. Although the documents 
she prepared in a prior relationship served 
their purpose when her former partner 
passed, Archer was ineligible to receive her 
partner's military pension benefits. Seeking 
the security enjoyed by other married 
couples, Archer and Call travelled to Iowa in 
July 2011, where they were wed. Because 
they could not be married in their home 
state, financial constraints dictated a modest 
wedding unattended by family and friends. 
“Despite the inconvenience and sad 
pragmatism of our Iowa marriage,” Call 
explains, “we needed whatever protections 
and security we could get for our 
relationship” because of Archer's failing 
health. However, Utah does not recognize 
Archer and Call's marriage. 
In March 2013, Kitchen, Sbeity, Wood, 
Partridge, Archer, and Call filed suit against 
the Governor and Attorney General of Utah 
and the Clerk of Salt Lake County (all in 
their official capacities). Plaintiffs 
challenged three provisions of Utah law 
relating to same-sex marriage. Utah Code § 
30–1–2(5) includes among the marriages 
that are “prohibited and declared void” those 
“between persons of the same sex.”  In 
2004, the Utah Legislature passed § 30–1–
4.1, which provides: 
(1)(a) It is the policy of this state to 
recognize as marriage only the legal 
union of a man and a woman as 
provided in this chapter. 
(b) Except for the relationship of 
marriage between a man and a 
woman recognized pursuant to this 
chapter, this state will not recognize, 
enforce, or give legal effect to any 
law creating any legal status, rights, 
benefits, or duties that are 
substantially equivalent to those 
provided under Utah law to a man 
and a woman because they are 
married. 
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1) 
impairs any contract or other rights, 
benefits, or duties that are 
enforceable independently of this 
section. 
The Legislature also referred a proposed 
constitutional amendment, known as 
Amendment 3, to Utah's voters. It states: 
(1) Marriage consists only of the 
legal union between a man and a 
woman. 
(2) No other domestic union, 
however denominated, may be 
recognized as a marriage or given the 
same or substantially equivalent 
legal effect. 
The State's official voter pamphlet described 
rulings by courts in other states striking 
down statutory prohibitions on same-sex 
marriage as inconsistent with state 
constitutional provisions. In the “arguments 
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for” section, written by a state representative 
and a state senator, the proponents argued 
that the Amendment was necessary to 
protect against a similar state-court ruling. 
They posited that the proposed amendment 
would not “promote intolerance, hatred, or 
bigotry” but would instead “preserve[an] 
historic understanding of marriage” rooted 
in “government's strong interest in 
maintaining public morality, the justified 
preference for heterosexual marriage with its 
capacity to perpetuate the human race and 
the importance of raising children in that 
preferred relationship.” Opponents of the 
amendment argued that it “singles out one 
specific group—people who are our 
relatives, neighbors, and co-workers—to 
deny them hundreds of rights and 
protections that other Utahns enjoy.” 
Amendment 3 passed with approximately 
66% of the vote and became § 29 of Article 
I of the Utah Constitution. This opinion will 
refer to both of the foregoing statutes, along 
with the constitutional amendment, 
collectively as “Amendment 3.” 
Plaintiffs allege that Amendment 3 violates 
their right to due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them 
of the fundamental liberty to marry the 
person of their choice and to have such a 
marriage recognized. They also claim that 
Amendment 3 violates the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Plaintiffs asserted their claims under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983, seeking both a declaratory 
judgment that Amendment 3 is 
unconstitutional and an injunction 
prohibiting its enforcement. 
On cross motions for summary judgment, 
the district court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiffs. It concluded that “[a]ll citizens, 
regardless of their sexual identity, have a 
fundamental right to liberty, and this right 
protects an individual's ability to marry and 
the intimate choices a person makes about 
marriage and family.” The court further held 
that Amendment 3 denied plaintiffs equal 
protection because it classified based on sex 
and sexual orientation without a rational 
basis. It declared Amendment 3 
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined 
enforcement of the challenged provisions.  
Utah's Governor and Attorney General filed 
a timely notice of appeal and moved to stay 
the district court's decision. Both the district 
court and this court denied a stay. The 
Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of 
the district court's injunction pending final 
disposition of the appeal by this court. 
II 
We first consider the issue of standing, 
although it was not raised by the parties. To 
possess Article III standing, a plaintiff must 
“establish (1) that he or she has suffered an 
injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly 
traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant; and[ ](3) that it is likely that the 
injury will be redressed by a favorable 
decision.” 
Plaintiffs suing public officials can satisfy 
the causation and redressability 
requirements of standing by demonstrating 
“a meaningful nexus” between the defendant 
and the asserted injury. “[T]he causation 
element of standing requires the named 
defendants to possess authority to enforce 
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the complained-of provision,” and “[t]he 
redressability prong is not met when a 
plaintiff seeks relief against a defendant with 
no power to enforce a challenged statute.” 
“Whether the Defendants have enforcement 
authority is related to whether, under Ex 
parte Young, they are proper state officials 
for suit.” Under Ex parte Young, a state 
defendant sued in his official capacity must 
“have some connection with the 
enforcement” of a challenged provision. “An 
officer need not have a special connection to 
the allegedly unconstitutional statute; rather, 
he need only have a particular duty to 
enforce the statute in question and a 
demonstrated willingness to exercise that 
duty.” 
We have no doubt that at least four of the 
plaintiffs possessed standing to sue the Salt 
Lake County Clerk based on their inability 
to obtain marriage licenses from the Clerk's 
office. Plaintiffs have identified several 
harms that flow from this denial, including 
financial injury. Because county clerks are 
responsible under Utah law for issuing 
marriage licenses and recording marriage 
certificates, these plaintiffs' injuries were 
caused by the Clerk's office and would be 
cured by an injunction prohibiting the 
enforcement of Amendment 3. Accordingly, 
the Salt Lake County Clerk possessed the 
requisite nexus to plaintiffs' injuries. 
The Salt Lake County Clerk, however, has 
not appealed from the district court's order. 
We must therefore consider whether the 
Governor and Attorney General are proper 
appellants absent the County Clerk. 
In Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson, 
we held that Oklahoma's Governor and 
Attorney General were not proper 
defendants in a challenge to that state's 
prohibition on same-sex marriage. Because 
of the legal and factual differences between 
that case and this one, we reach the opposite 
conclusion as to Utah's Governor and 
Attorney General. 
Our holding in Bishop turned on the 
conclusion that marriage licensing and 
recognition in Oklahoma were “within the 
administration of the judiciary.” The district 
court clerk charged with various duties 
related to marriage “ ‘is judicial personnel 
and is an arm of the court ... subject to the 
control of the Supreme Court and the 
supervisory control that it has passed down 
to the Administrative District Judge in the 
clerk's administrative district.’ ” 
Accordingly, we concluded that “the 
executive branch of Oklahoma's government 
has no authority to issue a marriage license 
or record a marriage.”  
In Utah, marriage licenses are issued not by 
court clerks but by county clerks. The 
Governor and Attorney General have 
explicitly taken the position in this litigation 
that they “have ample authority to ensure 
that” the Salt Lake County Clerk “return[s] 
to her former practice of limiting marriage 
licenses to man-woman couples in 
compliance with Utah law.” This assertion is 
supported by the Utah Code. The Governor 
is statutorily charged with “supervis[ing] the 
official conduct of all executive and 
ministerial officers” and “see[ing] that all 
offices are filled and the duties thereof 
performed.” In addition, he “may require the 
attorney general to aid any county attorney 
or district attorney in the discharge of his 
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duties.” Utah law allows an action for the 
removal of a county officer for “malfeasance 
in office” to be brought by a “county 
attorney, or district attorney for the county 
in which the officer was elected or 
appointed, or by the attorney general.” 
The Attorney General is required to 
“exercise supervisory powers over the 
district and county attorneys of the state in 
all matters pertaining to the duties of their 
offices” and “when required by the public 
service or directed by the governor, assist 
any county, district, or city attorney in the 
discharge of his duties.” A clerk who 
“knowingly issues a license for any 
prohibited marriage is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor.” Such charges would be filed 
by a county or district attorney under the 
supervision of the Attorney General. And 
the Governor could order the Attorney 
General to assist in such prosecution. 
The Governor and Attorney General have 
also demonstrated a “willingness to 
exercise” their duty to ensure clerks and 
other state officials enforce Amendment 3.  
State agencies with responsibility for the 
recognition of out-of-state marriages are 
being directed by the Governor in 
consultation with the Attorney 
General. These officials' authority over such 
agencies is confirmed by Utah law. For 
example, Plaintiffs Archer and Call, who 
were married in Iowa, specifically seek to 
file joint Utah tax returns. Although the 
Utah State Tax Commission is charged in 
the first instance with the duty “to 
administer and supervise the tax laws of the 
state,” the Attorney General in his 
constitutional role as “the legal adviser of 
the State officers,” is required by statute to 
offer his “opinion in writing ... to any state 
officer, board, or commission.” The 
Attorney General considers his opinions to 
the Utah State Tax Commission, even 
informal ones, to be “authoritative for the 
purposes” of the Commission “with respect 
to the specific questions presented.” The 
Attorney General is empowered to direct the 
Tax Commission to recognize Archer and 
Call's Iowa wedding, and the Commission 
would be legally obligated to follow that 
instruction and accept a joint tax return. 
Accordingly, Archer and Call had standing 
to sue the Attorney General for the injuries 
caused by Amendment 3's nonrecognition 
provisions. 
The same is true with respect to the 
Governor. Utah's “executive power” is 
“vested in the Governor.” In the exercise of 
that power, the Governor appoints the state's 
tax commissioners and has the power to 
initiate proceedings to remove them from 
office. Shortly after the Governor sent the 
above-quoted message to state agencies, the 
Tax Commission issued a Tax Notice stating 
that “[s]ame-sex couples who are eligible to 
file a joint federal income tax return and 
who elect to file jointly, may also file a joint 
2013 Utah Individual Income Tax return.” 
The Tax Notice refers to the district court's 
injunction, noting that a stay of that order 
had not been granted as of December 31, 
2013. Thus, one of the injuries explicitly 
cited by plaintiffs Archer and Call has been 
at least temporarily redressed by the district 
court's decision and actions taken in 
response to it by the Governor after 
consultation with the Attorney General. 
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We conclude that the Governor's and the 
Attorney General's actual exercise of 
supervisory power and their authority to 
compel compliance from county clerks and 
other officials provide the requisite nexus 
between them and Amendment 3. Although 
“it does not suffice if the injury complained 
of is the result of the independent action of 
some third party not before the court, that 
does not exclude injury produced by 
determinative or coercive effect upon the 
action of someone else.” And a state official 
is a proper defendant if he is “responsible 
for general supervision of the administration 
by the local ... officials” of a challenged 
provision. This is so even if the state 
officials are “not specifically empowered to 
ensure compliance with the statute at issue,” 
if they “clearly have assisted or currently 
assist in giving effect to the law.” 
We thus conclude that standing issues do not 
prevent us from considering this appeal. 
III 
In 1972, the Supreme Court summarily 
“dismissed for want of substantial federal 
question” an appeal from the Minnesota 
Supreme Court upholding a ban on same-sex 
marriage. The state court considered 
“whether a marriage of two persons of the 
same sex is authorized by state statutes and, 
if not, whether state authorization is 
constitutionally compelled.” It concluded 
that the statute used the term “marriage” as 
“one of common usage, meaning the state of 
union between persons of the opposite 
sex.” The state court further reasoned that 
“[t]he institution of marriage as a union of 
man and woman, uniquely involving the 
procreation and rearing of children within a 
family, is as old as the book of Genesis” and 
that “[t]he due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for 
restructuring [the institution of marriage] by 
judicial legislation.” As to the Equal 
Protection Clause, the court ruled that 
“[t]here is no irrational or invidious 
discrimination” because “in commonsense 
and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear 
distinction between a marital restriction 
based merely upon race and one based upon 
the fundamental difference in sex.”  
The Supreme Court has held that “summary 
dismissals are, of course, to be taken as 
rulings on the merits, in the sense that they 
rejected the specific challenges presented in 
the statement of jurisdiction and left 
undisturbed the judgment appealed from.” 
Summary dismissals  
do not, however, have the same 
precedential value here as does an 
opinion of this Court after briefing and 
oral argument on the merits. A 
summary dismissal of an appeal 
represents no more than a view that the 
judgment appealed from was correct as 
to those federal questions raised and 
necessary to the decision. It does not, as 
we have continued to stress, necessarily 
reflect our agreement with the opinion 
of the court whose judgment is 
appealed. 
“Summary affirmances and dismissals for 
want of a substantial federal question 
without doubt reject the specific challenges 
presented in the statement of jurisdiction.” 
And “[t]hey do prevent lower courts from 
coming to opposite conclusions on the 
precise issues presented and necessarily 
decided by those actions.” “[I]f the Court 
has branded a question as unsubstantial, it 
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remains so except when doctrinal 
developments indicate otherwise.” The 
district court concluded that “doctrinal 
developments” had superseded Baker. We 
agree. 
Two landmark decisions by the Supreme 
Court have undermined the notion that the 
question presented in Baker is 
insubstantial. Baker was decided before the 
Supreme Court held that “intimate conduct 
with another person ... can be but one 
element in a personal bond that is more 
enduring. The liberty protected by the 
Constitution allows homosexual persons the 
right to make this choice.” The decision 
in Baker also pre-dates the Court's opinion 
in Windsor. Several courts held prior 
to Windsor that Baker controlled the same-
sex marriage question. However, 
since Windsor was decided, nearly every 
federal court to have considered the issue—
including the district court below—has ruled 
that Baker does not control. 
We acknowledge that the question presented 
in Windsor is not identical to the question 
before us. DOMA interfered with New 
York's decision “that same-sex couples 
should have the right to marry and so live 
with pride in themselves and their union and 
in a status of equality with all other married 
persons,” a decision designed to “correct 
what its citizens and elected representatives 
perceived to be an injustice that they had not 
earlier known or understood.” The “State 
used its historic and essential authority to 
define the marital relation in this way,” and 
“its role and its power in making the 
decision enhanced the recognition, dignity, 
and protection of the class in their own 
community.” Because DOMA used this 
“state-defined class for the opposite 
purpose—to impose restrictions and 
disabilities,” the Court framed the 
dispositive question as “whether the 
resulting injury and indignity is a 
deprivation of an essential part of the liberty 
protected by the Fifth Amendment.” 
Although it is true that Windsor resolved 
tension between a state law permitting same-
sex marriage and a federal non-recognition 
provision, the Court's description of the 
issue indicates that its holding was not 
solely based on the scope of federal versus 
state powers. 
Appellants stress the presence of these 
federalism concerns in Windsor, which, as 
the Chief Justice noted in dissent, “come 
into play on the other side of the board in ... 
cases about the constitutionality of state” 
bans on same-sex marriage. 
The Windsor majority stated repeatedly that 
the regulation of marriage has traditionally 
been a state function. Appellants urge us to 
conclude that the “principles of federalism 
that Windsor would later reaffirm” require 
us to adhere to the Court's summary 
affirmance in Baker. 
However, the Windsor Court also explained 
that the federal government “in enacting 
discrete statutes, can make determinations 
that bear on marital rights and privileges.” 
The Windsor Court concluded it was 
“unnecessary to decide whether” DOMA “is 
a violation of the Constitution because it 
disrupts the federal balance.” 
Rather than relying on federalism principles, 
the Court framed the question presented as 
whether the “injury and indignity” caused by 
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DOMA “is a deprivation of an essential part 
of the liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment.” And the Court answered that 
question in the affirmative: 
The liberty protected by the Fifth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against 
denying to any person the equal 
protection of the laws. While the Fifth 
Amendment itself withdraws from 
Government the power to degrade or 
demean in the way this law does, the 
equal protection guarantee of the 
Fourteenth Amendment makes that 
Fifth Amendment right all the more 
specific and all the better understood 
and preserved. 
“The history of DOMA's enactment and its 
own text,” the Court concluded, 
“demonstrate that interference with the 
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a 
dignity conferred by the States in the 
exercise of their sovereign power, was more 
than an incidental effect of the federal 
statute. It was its essence.” DOMA 
“impose[d] a disadvantage, a separate status, 
and so a stigma upon all who enter into 
same-sex marriages....” The statute 
“undermine[d] both the public and private 
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex 
marriages” by telling “those couples, and all 
the world, that their otherwise valid 
marriages are unworthy of federal 
recognition.” And it “humiliate[d] tens of 
thousands of children now being raised by 
same-sex couples” by making “it even more 
difficult for the children to understand the 
integrity and closeness of their own family 
and its concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives.” 
Because DOMA's “differentiation demeans 
[same-sex] couple[s], whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects, and 
whose relationship[s] the State has sought to 
dignify,” the Court held that the statute 
violated the Fifth Amendment. 
The Windsor majority expressly cabined its 
holding to state-recognized marriages, and is 
thus not directly controlling. But the 
similarity between the claims at issue in 
Windsor and those asserted by the plaintiffs 
in this case cannot be ignored. This is 
particularly true with respect to plaintiffs 
Archer and Call, who seek recognition by 
Utah of a marriage that is valid in the state 
where it was performed. More generally, all 
six plaintiffs seek equal dignity for their 
marital aspirations. All claim that the state's 
differential treatment of them as compared 
to opposite-sex couples demeans and 
undermines their relationships and their 
personal autonomy. Although reasonable 
judges may disagree on the merits of the 
same-sex marriage question, we think it is 
clear that doctrinal developments foreclose 
the conclusion that the issue is, 
as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.  
IV 
We turn now to the merits of the issue 
before us. We must first decide whether the 
liberty interest protected in this case 
includes the right to marry, and whether that 
right is limited, as appellants contend, to 
those who would wed a person of the 
opposite sex. 
The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We 
review a grant of summary judgment de 
novo. A party is entitled to summary 
551 
 
judgment only if, viewing the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party, the movant is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law. 
“We review the decision to grant a 
permanent injunction for abuse of 
discretion.” To obtain a permanent 
injunction, a plaintiff must show: “(1) actual 
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm 
unless the injunction is issued; (3) the 
threatened injury outweighs the harm that 
the injunction may cause the opposing party; 
and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not 
adversely affect the public interest.” 
Because appellants have challenged only the 
merits aspect of the district court's decision, 
we do not consider the remaining factors. 
A 
“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within 
the term liberty are protected by the Federal 
Constitution from invasion by the States.” 
The doctrine of substantive due process 
extends protections to fundamental rights 
“in addition to the specific freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights.” To qualify 
as “fundamental,” a right must be 
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's 
history and tradition ... and implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither 
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were 
sacrificed.” 
1 
There can be little doubt that the right to 
marry is a fundamental liberty.  
The Court has long recognized that marriage 
is “the most important relation in life.” 
“Without doubt,” the liberty protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment includes the 
freedom “to marry, establish a home[,] and 
bring up children.”  
Appellants contend that these precedents 
and others establish only that opposite-sex 
marriage is a fundamental right. They 
highlight the Court's admonition to 
undertake a “careful description of the 
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” “This 
approach tends to rein in the subjective 
elements that are necessarily present in due-
process judicial review.” A right to same-
sex marriage cannot be deeply rooted in our 
tradition, appellants argue, because “until 
recent years, many citizens had not even 
considered the possibility that two persons 
of the same sex might aspire to occupy the 
same status and dignity as that of a man and 
woman in lawful marriage.” 
But “the right to marry is of fundamental 
importance for all individuals.” In numerous 
cases, the Court has discussed the right to 
marry at a broader level of generality than 
would be consistent with appellants' 
argument. The Loving Court concluded that 
a state statute voiding marriages between 
white and non-white participants violated 
the Due Process Clause. 
As the Court later explained, “[m]arriage is 
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and 
interracial marriage was illegal in most 
States in the 19th century, but the Court was 
no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect 
of liberty protected against state interference 
by the substantive component of the Due 
Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia.” Thus 
the question as stated in Loving, and as 
characterized in subsequent opinions, was 
not whether there is a deeply rooted tradition 
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of interracial marriage, or whether 
interracial marriage is implicit in the concept 
of ordered liberty; the right at issue was “the 
freedom of choice to marry.”  
Similarly, Zablocki considered an equal 
protection challenge to a state law barring 
individuals in arrearage of child support 
obligations from marrying. Because “the 
right to marry is of fundamental importance” 
and “the classification at issue ... 
significantly interfere[d] with the exercise of 
that right,” the Court determined that 
“critical examination of the state interests 
advanced in support of the classification 
[wa]s required.” It cautioned that not “every 
state regulation which relates in any way to 
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage 
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To 
the contrary, reasonable regulations that do 
not significantly interfere with decisions to 
enter into the marital relationship may 
legitimately be imposed.”  But the statute at 
issue was impermissible because it 
constituted a “serious intrusion into [the] 
freedom of choice in an area in which we 
have held such freedom to be fundamental” 
and could not “be upheld unless it [wa]s 
supported by sufficiently important state 
interests and [wa]s closely tailored to 
effectuate only those interests.” The right at 
issue was characterized as the right to marry, 
not as the right of child-support debtors to 
marry. 
2 
It is true that 
both Loving and Zablocki involved opposite-
sex couples. Such pairings, appellants 
remind us, may be naturally procreative—a 
potentially meaningful consideration given 
that the Court has previously discussed 
marriage and procreation together. 
But the Court has also described the 
fundamental right to marry as separate from 
the right to procreate, including 
in Glucksberg itself, the case upon which 
appellants' fundamental-right argument 
turns. Appellants' contention that the right to 
marriage is fundamental because of its 
procreative potential is also undercut 
by Turner v. Safley. 
As the Turner opinion highlights, the 
importance of marriage is based in great 
measure on “personal aspects” including the 
“expression[ ] of emotional support and 
public commitment.” This conclusion is 
consistent with the Court's other 
pronouncements on the freedom to marry, 
which focus on the freedom to choose one's 
spouse. The Turner Court also highlighted 
the role of marriage in allowing its 
participants to gain access to legal and 
financial benefits they would otherwise 
be denied. 
We must reject appellants' efforts to 
downplay the importance of the personal 
elements inherent in the institution of 
marriage, which they contend are “not the 
principal interests the State pursues by 
regulating marriage.” Rather than being 
“[m]utually exclusive” of the procreative 
potential of marriage, these freedoms—to 
choose one's spouse, to decide whether to 
conceive or adopt a child, to publicly 
proclaim an enduring commitment to remain 
together through thick and thin—reinforce 
the childrearing family structure. Further, 
such freedoms support the dignity of each 
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person, a factor emphasized by the 
Windsor Court. 
Of course, the Windsor decision dealt with 
federal recognition of marriages performed 
under state law. But with respect to plaintiffs 
Archer and Call, who were married in Iowa 
and whose marriage Utah will not recognize 
under Amendment 3, the analogy 
to Windsor is particularly apt. Amendment 
3's non-recognition provision, like DOMA,  
contrives to deprive some couples 
married under the laws of [another] 
State, but not other couples, of both 
rights and responsibilities.... By this 
dynamic [Amendment 3] undermines 
both the public and private significance 
of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages; 
for it tells those couples, and all the 
world, that their otherwise valid 
marriages are unworthy of [Utah's] 
recognition.... The differentiation 
demeans the couple, whose moral and 
sexual choices the Constitution protects. 
In light of Windsor, we agree with the 
multiple district courts that have held that 
the fundamental right to marry necessarily 
includes the right to remain married. 
And although we acknowledge that state 
recognition serves to “enhance[ ]” the 
interests at stake, surely a great deal of the 
dignity of same-sex relationships inheres in 
the loving bonds between those who seek to 
marry and the personal autonomy of making 
such choices. As the Court held 
in Lawrence, several years before discussing 
the state recognition issues present 
in Windsor,  
adults may choose to enter upon [an 
intimate] relationship in the confines of 
their homes and their own private lives 
and still retain their dignity as free 
persons. When sexuality finds overt 
expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but 
one element in a personal bond that is 
more enduring. The liberty protected by 
the Constitution allows homosexual 
persons the right to make this choice. 
Appellants' assertion that the right to marry 
is fundamental because it is linked to 
procreation is further undermined by the fact 
that individuals have a fundamental right to 
choose against reproduction. “If the right of 
privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into 
matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a 
child.” 
The Court has repeatedly referenced the 
raising of children—rather than just their 
creation—as a key factor in the inviolability 
of marital and familial choices. Although 
cohabitating same-sex couples are 
prohibited from jointly adopting children 
under Utah law as a result of the same-sex 
marriage ban, the record shows that nearly 
3,000 Utah children are being raised by 
same-sex couples. Thus childrearing, a 
liberty closely related to the right to marry, 
is one exercised by same-sex and opposite-
sex couples alike, as well as by single 
individuals.  
Appellants urge us to conclude that a court 
cannot determine whether there is a right to 
marriage without first defining the 
institution. They also say that the term 
“marriage” by its nature excludes same-sex 
couples. Glucksberg requires us to develop a 
“careful description of the asserted 
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fundamental liberty interest,” relying on 
“[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and 
practices [to] provide the crucial guideposts 
for responsible decisionmaking.” But we 
cannot conclude that the fundamental liberty 
interest in this case is limited to the right to 
marry a person of the opposite sex. As we 
have discussed, the Supreme Court has 
traditionally described the right to marry in 
broad terms independent of the persons 
exercising it. The Court's other substantive 
due process cases similarly eschew a 
discussion of the right-holder in defining the 
scope of the right. In Glucksberg, for 
example, the Court framed the question 
presented as “whether the ‘liberty’ specially 
protected in the Due Process Clause includes 
a right to commit suicide which itself 
includes a right to assistance in doing so.” 
The Court's formulation implicitly rejected 
respondents' framing of the claimed liberty 
as exercised by a specific class of persons: 
“Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's 
guarantee of liberty protects the decision of 
a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to 
bring about impending death in a certain, 
humane, and dignified manner.”  
Prior to the Windsor decision, several courts 
concluded that the well-established right to 
marry eo ipso cannot be exercised by those 
who would choose a spouse of the same sex. 
We nonetheless agree with plaintiffs that in 
describing the liberty interest at stake, it is 
impermissible to focus on the identity or 
class-membership of the individual 
exercising the right. “Simply put, 
fundamental rights are fundamental rights. 
They are not defined in terms of who is 
entitled to exercise them.” Plaintiffs seek to 
enter into legally recognized marriages, with 
all the concomitant rights and 
responsibilities enshrined in Utah law. They 
desire not to redefine the institution but to 
participate in it. 
Appellants' assertion that plaintiffs are 
excluded from the institution of marriage by 
definition is wholly circular. Nothing 
logically or physically precludes same-sex 
couples from marrying, as is amply 
demonstrated by the fact that many states 
now permit such marriages. Appellants' 
reliance on the modifier “definitional” does 
not serve a meaningful function in this 
context. To claim that marriage, by 
definition, excludes certain couples is 
simply to insist that those couples may not 
marry because they have historically been 
denied the right to do so. One might just as 
easily have argued that interracial couples 
are by definition excluded from the 
institution of marriage. But “neither history 
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting 
miscegenation from constitutional attack.” 
Our conclusion that we are not required to 
defer to Utah's characterization of its ban on 
same-sex marriage as a “definition” is 
reinforced by the Court's opinion 
in Windsor. Section 3 of DOMA, which the 
Court invalidated, “amend [ed] the 
Dictionary Act ... of the United States Code 
to provide a federal definition of ‘marriage’ 
and ‘spouse.’ ” In relevant part, the statute 
read: “ ‘[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a 
legal union between one man and one 
woman as husband and wife, and the word 
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the 
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.' ” 
Appellants repeatedly assert that 
Amendment 3 simply defines marriage, at 
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one point contrasting “the traditional 
definition of marriage” with “the anti-
miscegenation laws invalidated in Loving.” 
They contend that “Utah's marriage laws 
merely define marriage within its borders.” 
The Court's holding 
in Windsor demonstrates that a provision 
labeled a “definition” is not immune from 
constitutional scrutiny. We see no reason to 
allow Utah's invocation of its power to 
“define the marital relation,” to become “a 
talisman, by whose magic power the whole 
fabric which the law had erected ... is at 
once dissolved.” 
Although courts may be tempted “to 
suppose that the Due Process Clause 
protects only those practices, defined at the 
most specific level, that were protected 
against government interference by other 
rules of law when the Fourteenth 
Amendment was ratified.... such a view 
would be inconsistent with our law.” “A 
prime part of the history of our Constitution 
... is the story of the extension of 
constitutional rights and protections to 
people once ignored or excluded.” 
3 
The Supreme Court's sexual orientation 
jurisprudence further precludes us from 
defining the fundamental right at issue in the 
manner sought by the appellants. 
In Lawrence, the Court struck down as 
violative of due process a statute that 
prohibited sexual conduct between 
individuals of the same sex. The Court 
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, which in 
upholding a similar statute had framed the 
question as “whether the Federal 
Constitution confers a fundamental right 
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and 
hence invalidates the laws of the many 
States that still make such conduct illegal 
and have done so for a very long time.” 
The Lawrence Court held that this framing 
“fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the 
liberty at stake” and “misapprehended the 
claim of liberty there presented to it.” 
The Court acknowledged that “for centuries 
there have been powerful voices to condemn 
homosexual conduct as immoral,” but held 
that its obligation was “to define the liberty 
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.” 
“[B]efore 1961 all 50 States had outlawed 
sodomy,” yet “[h]istory and tradition are the 
starting point but not in all cases the ending 
point of the substantive due process 
inquiry.” The Court firmly rejected Bowers' 
characterization of the liberty at issue: “To 
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the 
right to engage in certain sexual conduct 
demeans the claim the individual put 
forward, just as it would demean a married 
couple were it to be said marriage is simply 
about the right to have sexual intercourse.”   
The Court's rejection of the manner in 
which Bowers described the liberty interest 
involved is applicable to the framing of the 
issue before us. There was clearly no history 
of a protected right to “homosexual 
sodomy,” just as there is no lengthy tradition 
of same-sex marriage. But 
the Lawrence opinion indicates that the 
approach urged by appellants is too narrow. 
Just as it was improper to ask whether there 
is a right to engage in homosexual sex, we 
do not ask whether there is a right to 
participate in same-sex marriage.  
556 
 
We must also note that Lawrence itself 
alluded to marriage, stating that “our laws 
and tradition afford constitutional protection 
to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family 
relationships, child rearing, and education.” 
The Court quoted Casey's holding that 
matters “involving the most intimate and 
personal choices a person may make in a 
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity 
and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment” 
and ruled that “[p]ersons in a homosexual 
relationship may seek autonomy for these 
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.” 
The drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments “knew times can blind us to 
certain truths and later generations can see 
that laws once thought necessary and proper 
in fact serve only to oppress. As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every 
generation can invoke its principles in their 
own search for greater freedom.” A 
generation ago, recognition of the 
fundamental right to marry as applying to 
persons of the same sex might have been 
unimaginable. A generation ago, the 
declaration by gay and lesbian couples of 
what may have been in their hearts would 
have had to remain unspoken. Not until 
contemporary times have laws stigmatizing 
or even criminalizing gay men and women 
been felled, allowing their relationships to 
surface to an open society. As the district 
court eloquently explained, “it is not the 
Constitution that has changed, but the 
knowledge of what it means to be gay or 
lesbian.” Consistent with our constitutional 
tradition of recognizing the liberty of those 
previously excluded, we conclude that 
plaintiffs possess a fundamental right to 
marry and to have their marriages 
recognized. 
B 
The Due Process Clause “forbids the 
government to infringe certain fundamental 
liberty interests at all, no matter what 
process is provided, unless the infringement 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.” By the same token, if a 
classification “impinge[s] upon the exercise 
of a fundamental right,” the Equal 
Protection Clause requires “the State to 
demonstrate that its classification has been 
precisely tailored to serve a compelling 
governmental interest.” Having persuaded 
us that the right to marry is a fundamental 
liberty, plaintiffs will prevail on their due 
process and equal protection claims unless 
appellants can show that Amendment 3 
survives strict scrutiny. 
A provision subject to strict scrutiny “cannot 
rest upon a generalized assertion as to the 
classification's relevance to its goals.” “The 
purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement 
is to ensure that the means chosen fit the 
compelling goal so closely that there is little 
or no possibility that the motive for the 
classification was illegitimate.” Only “the 
most exact connection between justification 
and classification” survives. 
Appellants advance four justifications for 
Amendment 3. They contend it furthers the 
state's interests in: (1) “fostering a child-
centric marriage culture that encourages 
parents to subordinate their own interests to 
the needs of their children”; (2) “children 
being raised by their biological mothers and 
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fathers—or at least by a married mother and 
father—in a stable home”; (3) “ensuring 
adequate reproduction”; and (4) 
“accommodating religious freedom and 
reducing the potential for civic strife.” 
1 
We will assume that the first three rationales 
asserted by appellants are compelling. These 
justifications falter, however, on the means 
prong of the strict scrutiny test. Each rests 
on a link between marriage and procreation. 
Appellants contend that Utah has 
“steadfastly sought to reserve unique social 
recognition for man-woman marriage so as 
to guide as many procreative couples as 
possible into the optimal, conjugal 
childrearing model”; that “children suffer 
when procreation and childrearing occur 
outside stable man-woman marriages”; and 
that “[b]y providing special privileges and 
status to couples that are uniquely capable of 
producing offspring without biological 
assistance from third parties, the State sends 
a clear if subtle message to all of its citizens 
that natural reproduction is healthy, 
desirable and highly valued.” The common 
thread running through each of appellants' 
first three arguments is the claim that 
allowing same-sex couples to marry “would 
break the critical conceptual link between 
marriage and procreation.” 
The challenged restrictions on the right to 
marry and on recognition of otherwise valid 
marriages, however, do not differentiate 
between procreative and non-procreative 
couples. Instead, Utah citizens may choose a 
spouse of the opposite sex regardless of the 
pairing's procreative capacity. The elderly, 
those medically unable to conceive, and 
those who exercise their fundamental right 
not to have biological children are free to 
marry and have their out-of-state marriages 
recognized in Utah, apparently without 
breaking the “conceptual link between 
marriage and procreation.” The only explicit 
reference to reproduction in Utah's marriage 
law is a provision that allows first cousins to 
marry if “both parties are 65 years of age or 
older; or ... if both parties are 55 years of 
age or older, upon a finding by the district 
court ... that either party is unable to 
reproduce.” This statute thus extends 
marriage rights to certain couples based on a 
showing of inability to reproduce. 
Such a mismatch between the class 
identified by a challenged law and the 
characteristic allegedly relevant to the state's 
interest is precisely the type of imprecision 
prohibited by heightened scrutiny. Utah's 
ban on polygamy, for example, is justified 
by arguments against polygamy. Similarly, 
barring minors from marriage may be 
justified based on arguments specific to 
minors as a class. But appellants fail to 
advance any argument against same-sex 
marriage that is based specifically on its 
alleged intrinsic ills. 
Instead of explaining why same-sex 
marriage qua same-sex marriage is 
undesirable, each of the appellants' 
justifications rests fundamentally on a 
sleight of hand in which same-sex marriage 
is used as a proxy for a different 
characteristic shared by both same-sex and 
some opposite-sex couples. Same-sex 
marriage must be banned, appellants argue, 
because same-sex couples are not naturally 
procreative. But the state permits many 
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other types of non-procreative couples to 
wed. Same-sex marriage cannot be allowed, 
appellants assert, because it is better for 
children to be raised by biological parents. 
Yet adoptive parents, who have the full 
panoply of rights and duties of biological 
parents, are free to marry. As are opposite-
sex couples who choose assisted 
reproduction. 
The Supreme Court has similarly eschewed 
such means-ends mismatches. For example, 
in Bernal v. Fainter, the Court concluded 
that a Texas statute prohibiting resident 
aliens from becoming notaries failed strict 
scrutiny. The state argued that the provision 
was justified by the state's interest in 
licensing notaries familiar with state law. 
But the Court rejected the state's attempt to 
justify a classification based on alienage 
with an explanation based on knowledge. 
Just as a state cannot justify an alienage 
classification by reference to a separate 
characteristic such as familiarity with state 
law, appellants cannot assert procreative 
potential as a basis to deny marriage rights 
to same-sex couples. Under strict scrutiny, 
the state must justify the specific means it 
has chosen rather than relying on some other 
characteristic that correlates loosely with the 
actual restriction at issue. 
Utah law sanctions many marriages that 
share the characteristic—inability to 
procreate—ostensibly targeted by 
Amendment 3. The absence of narrow 
tailoring is often revealed by such under-
inclusiveness. In Zablocki, the state 
attempted to defend its prohibition on 
marriage by child-support debtors on the 
ground that the statute “prevent[ed] the 
applicants from incurring new support 
obligations.” “But the challenged 
provisions,” the Court explained, “are 
grossly underinclusive with respect to this 
purpose, since they do not limit in any way 
new financial commitments by the applicant 
other than those arising out of the 
contemplated marriage.” Similarly, in 
Eisenstadt, the Court rejected the argument 
that unmarried individuals might be 
prohibited from using contraceptives based 
on the view that contraception is 
immoral. The Court held that “the State 
could not, consistently with the Equal 
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to 
unmarried but not to married persons. In 
each case the evil, as perceived by the State, 
would be identical, and the underinclusion 
would be invidious.” 
A state may not impinge upon the exercise 
of a fundamental right as to some, but not 
all, of the individuals who share a 
characteristic urged to be relevant. 
A hypothetical state law restricting the 
institution of marriage to only those who are 
able and willing to procreate would plainly 
raise its own constitutional concerns. That 
question is not before us, and we do not 
address it. We merely observe that a state 
may not satisfy the narrow tailoring 
requirement by pointing to a trait shared by 
those on both sides of a challenged 
classification. 
Among the myriad types of non-procreative 
couples, only those Utahns who seek to 
marry a partner of the same sex are 
categorically excluded from the institution 
of marriage. Only same-sex couples, 
appellants claim, need to be excluded to 
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further the state's interest in communicating 
the link between unassisted biological 
procreation and marriage. As between non-
procreative opposite-sex couples and same-
sex couples, we can discern no meaningful 
distinction with respect to appellants' 
interest in fostering biological reproduction 
within marriages. 
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated 
should be treated alike.” Extending the 
benefits and protections of a civil society to 
some but not all similarly situated families 
violates this critical guarantee. 
2 
Appellants argue that procreative couples 
must be channeled into committed 
relationships in order to promote the State's 
interests in childbearing and optimal 
childrearing. This argument fails because the 
prohibition on same-sex marriage has an 
insufficient causal connection to the State's 
articulated goals. 
It is urged upon us that permitting same-sex 
couples to marry would have far-reaching 
and drastic consequences for Utah's 
opposite-sex couples. Appellants contend 
that the recognition of same-sex marriage 
would result in a parade of horribles, 
causing: “parents to raise their existing 
biological children without the other 
biological parent”; “couples conceiving 
children without the stability that marriage 
would otherwise bring”; “a substantial 
decline in the public's interest in marriage”; 
“adults to [forgo] or severely limit the 
number of their children based on concerns 
for their own convenience”; and “a busy or 
irresponsible parent to believe it's 
appropriate to sacrifice his child's welfare to 
his own needs for independence, free time, 
etc.” 
In some instances, courts “must accord 
substantial deference to the predictive 
judgments” of legislative authorities. 
“Sound policymaking often requires 
legislators to forecast future events and to 
anticipate the likely impact of these events 
based on deductions and inferences for 
which complete empirical support may be 
unavailable.” But even under more relaxed 
forms of scrutiny, a challenged classification 
“must find some footing in the realities of 
the subject addressed by the legislation” 
based on a “reasonably conceivable state of 
facts.”  
We emphatically agree with the numerous 
cases decided since Windsor that it is wholly 
illogical to believe that state recognition of 
the love and commitment between same-sex 
couples will alter the most intimate and 
personal decisions of opposite-sex couples. 
As the district court held, “[t]here is no 
reason to believe that Amendment 3 has any 
effect on the choices of couples to have or 
raise children, whether they are opposite-sex 
couples or same-sex couples.” This was the 
first of several federal court decisions 
reaching the same conclusion. 
A state's interest in developing and 
sustaining committed relationships between 
childbearing couples is simply not 
connected to its recognition of same-sex 
marriages. Regardless of whether some 
individuals are denied the right to choose 
their spouse, the same set of duties, 
responsibilities, and benefits set forth under 
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Utah law apply to those naturally 
procreative pairings touted by appellants. 
We cannot imagine a scenario under which 
recognizing same-sex marriages would 
affect the decision of a member of an 
opposite-sex couple to have a child, to marry 
or stay married to a partner, or to make 
personal sacrifices for a child. We agree 
with the district court that such decisions, 
among “the most intimate and personal ... a 
person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy,” 
are unrelated to the government's treatment 
of same-sex marriage. To the extent that 
they are related, the relation exists because 
the State of Utah has chosen to burden the 
ability of one class of citizens to make such 
intimate and personal choices. 
3 
Appellants also argue that Utah's ban on 
same-sex marriage is justified by gendered 
parenting preferences. They contend that 
even for families that are not biologically 
connected, the state has an interest in 
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples 
because “men and women parent children 
differently.” 
But a prohibition on same-sex marriage is 
not narrowly tailored toward the goal of 
encouraging gendered parenting styles. The 
state does not restrict the right to marry or 
its recognition of marriage based on 
compliance with any set of parenting roles, 
or even parenting quality. Instead, every 
same-sex couple, regardless of parenting 
style, is barred from marriage and every 
opposite-sex couple, irrespective of 
parenting style, is permitted to marry. 
The state's child custody regime also belies 
adherence to a rigidly gendered view of 
parents' abilities. As with appellants' 
asserted procreation rationale, we are 
offered no coherent explanation for the 
state's decision to impose disabilities upon 
only one subclass of those sharing a claimed 
deficiency. 
The Supreme Court has previously rejected 
state attempts to classify parents with such a 
broad brush. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court 
considered the validity of a state law that 
made children of unwed parents wards of 
the state upon death of the mother. The state 
defended this provision by asserting that 
“unmarried fathers can reasonably be 
presumed to be unqualified to raise their 
children.” “But all unmarried fathers are not 
in this category; some are wholly suited to 
have custody of their children.” Just as the 
state law at issue in Stanley “needlessly 
risk[ed] running roughshod over the 
important interests of both parent and child,” 
Amendment 3 cannot be justified by the 
impermissibly overbroad assumption that 
any opposite-sex couple is preferable to any 
same-sex couple. 
Appellants have retreated from any 
categorical conclusions regarding the quality 
of same-sex parenting. Although they 
presented to the district court voluminous 
scholarship addressing various parenting 
issues, they now take the position that the 
social science is unsettled. At oral argument, 
counsel for appellants stated that “the 
bottom line” regarding the consequences of 
same-sex parenting “is that the science is 
inconclusive.” 
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Although we assume that the State's asserted 
interest in biological parenting is 
compelling, this assumption does not require 
us to accept appellants' related arguments on 
faith. We cannot embrace the contention that 
children raised by opposite-sex parents fare 
better than children raised by same-sex 
parents—to the extent appellants continue to 
press it—in light of their representations to 
this court. Appellants' only reasoning in this 
regard is that there might be advantages in 
one parenting arrangement that are lacking 
in the other. On strict scrutiny, an argument 
based only on pure speculation and 
conjecture cannot carry the day. Appellants' 
tepid defense of their parenting theory 
further highlights the looseness of the fit 
between the State's chosen means and 
appellants' asserted end. 
Against the State's claim of uncertainty we 
must weigh the harm Amendment 3 
currently works against the children of 
same-sex couples. If appellants cannot tell 
us with any degree of confidence that they 
believe opposite-sex parenting produces 
better outcomes on the whole—and they 
evidently cannot—they fail to justify this 
palpable harm that the Supreme Court has 
unequivocally condemned. 
The Windsor majority, stressing the same 
detrimental impacts of DOMA, explained 
that the refusal to recognize same-sex 
marriages brings “financial harm to children 
of same-sex couples” and makes “it even 
more difficult for the children [of same-sex 
couples] to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and its 
concord with other families in their 
community and in their daily lives.” 
Windsor thus indicates that same-sex 
marriage restrictions communicate to 
children the message that same-sex parents 
are less deserving of family recognition than 
other parents. Appellants rely heavily on 
their predictions that Amendment 3 will 
encourage adults to make various decisions 
that benefit society. But regardless of the 
signals the law sends to adults, Amendment 
3, like DOMA, conveys a harmful message 
to the children of same-sex couples. These 
collateral consequences further suggest that 
the fit between the means and the end is 
insufficient to survive strict scrutiny.  
4 
Appellants' fourth and final justification for 
Amendment 3, “accommodating religious 
freedom and reducing the potential for civic 
strife,” fails for reasons independent of the 
foregoing. Appellants contend that a 
prohibition on same-sex marriage “is 
essential to preserving social harmony in the 
State” and that allowing same-sex couples to 
marry “would create the potential for 
religion-related strife.” 
Even assuming that appellants are correct in 
predicting that some substantial degree of 
discord will follow state recognition of 
same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that public opposition 
cannot provide cover for a violation of 
fundamental rights. In Watson v. City of 
Memphis, for example, the Court rejected a 
city's claim that “community confusion and 
turmoil” permitted it to delay desegregation 
of its public parks. And in Cleburne, the 
Court held that negative attitudes toward the 
class at issue (intellectually impaired 
individuals) “are not permissible bases for 
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treating a home for the mentally retarded 
differently.” “It is plain that the electorate as 
a whole, whether by referendum or 
otherwise, could not order city action 
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, and 
the city may not avoid the strictures of that 
Clause by deferring to the wishes or 
objections of some fraction of the body 
politic.”  
Appellants acknowledge that a state may not 
“invoke concerns about religious freedom or 
religion-related social strife as a basis for 
denying rights otherwise guaranteed by the 
Constitution.” But they argue that the social 
and religious strife argument qualifies as 
legitimate because a fundamental right is not 
at issue in this case. Because we have 
rejected appellants' contention on this point, 
their fourth justification necessarily fails. 
We also emphasize, as did the district court, 
that today's decision relates solely to civil 
marriage. Plaintiffs must be accorded the 
same legal status presently granted to 
married couples, but religious institutions 
remain as free as they always have been to 
practice their sacraments and traditions as 
they see fit. We respect the views advanced 
by members of various religious 
communities and their discussions of the 
theological history of marriage. And we 
continue to recognize the right of the various 
religions to define marriage according to 
their moral, historical, and ethical precepts. 
Our opinion does not intrude into that 
domain or the exercise of religious 
principles in this arena. The right of an 
officiant to perform or decline to perform a 
religious ceremony is unaffected by today's 
ruling.  
C 
Appellants raise a number of prudential 
concerns in addition to the four legal 
justifications discussed above. They stress 
the value of democratic decision-making 
and the benefits of federalism in allowing 
states to serve as laboratories for the rules 
concerning marriage. As a matter of policy, 
it might well be preferable to allow the 
national debate on same-sex marriage to 
play out through legislative and democratic 
channels. Some will no doubt view today's 
decision as “robbing the winners of an 
honest victory, and the losers of the peace 
that comes from a fair defeat.” 
But the judiciary is not empowered to pick 
and choose the timing of its decisions. “It is 
a judge's duty to decide all cases within his 
jurisdiction that are brought before him, 
including controversial cases that arouse the 
most intense feelings in the litigants.” 
Plaintiffs in this case have convinced us that 
Amendment 3 violates their fundamental 
right to marry and to have their marriages 
recognized. We may not deny them relief 
based on a mere preference that their 
arguments be settled elsewhere. Nor may we 
defer to majority will in dealing with matters 
so central to personal autonomy. The 
protection and exercise of fundamental 
rights are not matters for opinion polls or the 
ballot box. “One's right to life, liberty, and 
property, to free speech, a free press, 
freedom of worship and assembly, and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to 
vote; they depend on the outcome of no 
elections.” 
Similarly, the experimental value of 
federalism cannot overcome plaintiffs' rights 
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to due process and equal protection. Despite 
Windsor's emphasis on state authority over 
marriage, the Court repeatedly tempered its 
pronouncements with the caveat that “[s]tate 
laws defining and regulating marriage, of 
course, must respect the constitutional rights 
of persons.” Our federalist structure is 
designed to “secure[ ] to citizens the 
liberties that derive from the diffusion of 
sovereign power” rather than to limit 
fundamental freedoms. 
Appellants also suggest that today's ruling 
will place courts on a slippery slope towards 
recognizing other forms of currently 
prohibited marriages. Although we have no 
occasion to weigh in on the validity of laws 
not challenged in this case, same-sex 
marriage prohibitions differ in at least one 
key respect from the types of marriages the 
appellants identify: Unlike polygamous or 
incestuous marriages, the Supreme Court 
has explicitly extended constitutional 
protection to intimate same-sex 
relationships, and to the public 
manifestations of those relationships. Our 
holding that plaintiffs seek to exercise a 
fundamental right turns in large measure on 
this jurisprudential foundation that does not 
exist as to the hypothetical challenges 
identified by appellants. 
V 
In summary, we hold that under the Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the 
United States Constitution, those who wish 
to marry a person of the same sex are 
entitled to exercise the same fundamental 
right as is recognized for persons who wish 
to marry a person of the opposite sex, and 
that Amendment 3 and similar statutory 
enactments do not withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. We AFFIRM the judgment of the 
district court. 
In consideration of the Supreme Court's 
decision to stay the district court's injunction 
pending the appeal to our circuit, we 
conclude it is appropriate to STAY our 
mandate pending the disposition of any 
subsequently filed petition for writ of 
certiorari.  
It is so ordered. 
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part 
and dissenting in part. 
I concur with the court's result that Plaintiffs 
have standing to challenge the provisions at 
issue, that the Salt Lake County Clerk, 
Governor, and Attorney General were 
proper Defendants, and that the appeal may 
proceed despite the absence of the Salt Lake 
County Clerk. I disagree with this court's 
conclusions that (1) Baker v. Nelson need 
not be followed and that (2) the liberty 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment 
includes a fundamental right which requires 
Utah to extend marriage to same-gender 
couples and recognize same-gender 
marriages from other states. Because I 
conclude that there is no such fundamental 
right, it is unnecessary to consider whether 
Utah's justifications for retaining its 
repeatedly-enacted concept of marriage pass 
heightened scrutiny. In my view, the 
provisions should be analyzed under 
traditional equal protection analysis and 
upheld as rationally related to (1) 
responsible procreation, (2) effective 
parenting, and (3) the desire to proceed 
cautiously in this evolving area. 
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For the following reasons, I respectfully 
dissent. 
A. Baker v. Nelson 
The petitioners in Baker argued that 
Minnesota's marriage scheme violated due 
process and equal protection. The Minnesota 
Supreme Court unambiguously rejected the 
notion that same-gender marriage was a 
fundamental right, interpreting Loving v. 
Virginia as resting upon the Constitution's 
prohibition of race discrimination. Absent 
irrational or invidious discrimination, a 
“theoretically imperfect” marriage 
classification does not offend equal 
protection or due process under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The import 
of Baker to this case is clear: neither due 
process nor equal protection bar states from 
defining marriage as between one man and 
one woman, or require states to extend 
marriage to same-gender couples. 
A summary dismissal is a merits 
determination and a lower federal court 
should not come to an opposite conclusion 
on the issues presented. The district court 
relied upon a statement in Hicks v. 
Miranda that a question remains 
unsubstantial unless “doctrinal 
developments” may suggest otherwise. On 
this point, Miranda held that a summary 
dismissal could not be disregarded. Were 
there any doubt, the “doctrinal 
developments” exception was followed by a 
statement that summary decisions are 
binding on lower courts until the Court 
notifies otherwise.  
The rule is clear: if a Supreme Court case is 
directly on point, a lower federal court 
should rely on it so the Supreme Court may 
exercise “the prerogative of overruling its 
own decisions.” The Supreme Court is 
certainly free to re-examine its precedents, 
but it discourages lower courts from 
concluding it has overruled earlier precedent 
by implication. The majority construes the 
unequivocal statement in Rodriguez de 
Quijas (and presumably Agostini ) as 
inapplicable because it appeared in a merits 
disposition and accordingly did not 
“overrule” the “doctrinal developments rule” 
as to summary dispositions. But that is just 
another way of stating that a summary 
disposition is not a merits disposition, which 
is patently incorrect. Though the Supreme 
Court may not accord Baker the same 
deference as an opinion after briefing and 
argument, it is nonetheless precedential for 
this court. Summary dismissals are merits 
rulings as to those questions raised in the 
jurisdictional statement. 
Plaintiffs argue that Baker did not address 
the precise issues here because “[t]he 
judgment affirmed in Baker addressed 
whether same-sex couples were denied 
equal protection and due process by 
Minnesota's marriage statute—a measure 
that did not indicate on its face whether 
same-sex couples could marry and that had 
not been enacted for the express purpose of 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage.” 
They further argue that Utah's non-
recognition of Plaintiffs Archer and Call's 
Iowa marriage distinguishes this case 
from Baker. Neither reason is persuasive. 
The fact remains that the Minnesota 
Supreme Court interpreted the state statute 
(at the time) to not require same-gender 
marriage and decided largely the same 
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federal constitutional questions presented 
here. To the extent there is no right to same-
gender marriage emanating from the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a state should not 
be compelled to recognize it. 
Regardless, subsequent doctrinal 
developments have not undermined the 
Court's traditional deference to the States in 
the field of domestic relations. To be sure, 
the district court concluded otherwise based 
upon the following Supreme Court 
developments: (1) gender becoming a quasi-
suspect class, (2) invalidation of a state law 
repealing and barring sexual-orientation 
protection, (3) invalidation of a statute that 
proscribed same-gender sexual relations 
insofar as private conduct among consenting 
adults, (4) declaring the Defense of 
Marriage Act's (“DOMA”) definition of 
“marriage” and “spouse” to exclude same-
gender marriages as violative of Fifth 
Amendment due process and equal 
protection principles. This court relies on 
Lawrence and Windsor as justification for 
not deferring to Baker. As discussed below, 
none of these developments can override our 
obligation to follow (rather than lead) on the 
issue of whether a state is required to extend 
marriage to same-gender couples. At best, 
the developments relied upon are ambiguous 
and certainly do not compel the conclusion 
that the Supreme Court will interpret the 
Fourteenth Amendment to require every 
state to extend marriage to same-gender 
couples, regardless of contrary state law. 
B. Equal Protection–Gender 
Discrimination 
Plaintiffs argue that defining marriage to 
exclude same-gender unions is based upon 
gender stereotyping where “the law 
presumed women to be legally, socially, and 
financially dependent upon men.” But this 
case involves no disparate treatment based 
upon gender that might invite intermediate 
scrutiny. Utah's constitutional and statutory 
provisions, Utah Const. art. I, § 29 and Utah 
Code §§ 30–1–2(5), 30–1–4.1, enacted in 
1977 and 2004, simply define marriage as 
the legal union of a man and a woman and 
do not recognize any other domestic union, 
i.e., same-gender marriage. They apply to 
same-gender male couples and same-gender 
female couples alike. 
C. Equal Protection–Sexual Orientation 
Plaintiffs argue that defining marriage to 
exclude same-gender unions is a form of 
sexual orientation discrimination triggering 
heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has 
yet to decide the level of scrutiny attendant 
to classifications based upon sexual 
orientation, but this court has rejected 
heightened scrutiny. Although Plaintiffs 
argue that our precedent does not justify 
such a position, one panel of this court may 
not overrule another absent superseding en 
banc review or a Supreme Court decision 
invalidating our precedent. Neither has 
occurred here. 
D. Due Process–Fundamental Right 
The Plaintiffs contend that they are not 
relying upon a fundamental right to same-
gender marriage, but instead a fundamental 
right to marriage simpliciter. They contend 
that freedom to marry is self-defining and 
without reference to those who assert it or 
have been excluded from it. Of course, the 
difficulty with this is that marriage does not 
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exist in a vacuum; it is a public institution, 
and states have the right to regulate it. That 
right necessarily encompasses the right to 
limit marriage and decline to recognize 
marriages which would be prohibited; were 
the rule as the Plaintiffs contend, that 
marriage is a freestanding right, Utah's 
prohibition on bigamy would be an invalid 
restriction. That proposition has been 
soundly rejected. Likewise, were marriage a 
freestanding right without reference to the 
parties, Utah would be hard-pressed to 
prohibit marriages for minors under 15 and 
impose conditions for other minors.  
As noted, the Court has recognized a 
fundamental right to marriage protected by 
substantive due process. As such, 
restrictions on the right are subject to strict 
scrutiny: they must be narrowly tailored to 
further compelling state interests. But it is a 
stretch to cast those cases in support of a 
fundamental right to same-gender marriage. 
Here's why. First, same-gender marriage is a 
very recent phenomenon; for centuries 
“marriage” has been universally understood 
to require two persons of opposite gender. 
Indeed, this case is better understood as an 
effort to extend marriage to persons of the 
same gender by redefining marriage. 
Second, nothing suggests that the term 
“marriage” as used in those cases had any 
meaning other than what was commonly 
understood for centuries. Courts do not 
decide what is not before them. That the 
Court did not refer to a “right to interracial 
marriage,” or a “right to inmate marriage” 
cannot obscure what was decided; the 
Supreme Court announced a right with 
objective meaning and contours. Third, 
given the ephemeral nature of substantive 
due process, recognition of fundamental 
rights requires a right deeply rooted in 
United States history and tradition, and a 
careful and precise definition of the right at 
issue. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' 
contention, it is entirely appropriate for the 
State to characterize the right sought as one 
of “same-gender marriage” and focus 
attention on its recent development. Perhaps 
someday same-gender marriage will become 
part of this country's history and tradition, 
but that is not a choice this court should 
make. 
Much of this court's opinion is dedicated to 
finding otherwise by separating marriage 
from procreation and expounding on how 
other substantive due process and privacy 
concepts, including personal autonomy, 
dignity, family relationships, reproductive 
rights, and the like, are the antecedents and 
complements of same-gender marriage. But 
we should be reluctant to announce a 
fundamental right by implication. Not only 
is that beyond our power, it is completely 
arbitrary and impractical; as in this case, a 
state should be allowed to adopt change if 
desired and implement it. As these 
proceedings demonstrate, the State has a 
much better handle on what statutory and 
administrative provisions are involved, and 
what is necessary to implement change, than 
we do. 
E. Equal Protection–Rational Basis 
Plaintiffs contend and the district court so 
found that the provisions cannot be 
sustained under rational basis review. The 
State offered several rationales including (1) 
encouraging responsible procreation given 
567 
 
the unique ability of opposite-gender 
couples to conceive, (2) effective parenting 
to benefit the offspring, and (3) proceeding 
with caution insofar as altering and 
expanding the definition of marriage. The 
district court rejected these rationales based 
on a lack of evidence and/or a lack of a 
rational connection between excluding 
same-gender couples from marriage and the 
asserted justification.  
Equal protection “is essentially a direction 
that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.” Given the provisions in this 
case, we should look at the definition of 
marriage and the exclusion of same-gender 
couples and inquire whether “the 
classification ... is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.”  
To the extent the district court thought that 
the State had any obligation to produce 
evidence, surely it was incorrect. Though the 
State is not precluded from relying upon 
evidence, rational basis analysis is a legal 
inquiry. The district court seems to have 
misunderstood the essence of rational basis 
review: extreme deference, the hallmark of 
judicial restraint. The State could rely upon 
any plausible reason and contend that the 
classification might arguably advance that 
reason. Plaintiffs had the burden of refuting 
all plausible reasons for the challenged 
amendment and statutes. 
Whether a reason actually motivated the 
electorate or the legislature is irrelevant; 
neither is required to state its reason for a 
choice. Legislative choices involve line-
drawing, and the fact that such line-drawing 
may result in some inequity is not 
determinative. Accordingly, an enactment 
may be over-inclusive and/or under-
inclusive yet still have a rational basis. The 
fact that the classification could be improved 
or is ill-advised is not enough to invalidate 
it; the political process is responsible for 
remedying perceived problems. 
Judged against these standards, Utah should 
prevail on a rational basis analysis. Plaintiffs 
have not overcome their “heavy burden” of 
demonstrating that the provisions are 
“arbitrary and irrational,” that no electorate 
or legislature could reasonably believe the 
underlying legislative facts to be true. It is 
biologically undeniable that opposite-gender 
marriage has a procreative potential that 
same-gender marriage lacks. The inherent 
differences between the biological sexes are 
permissible legislative considerations, and 
indeed distinguish gender from those 
classifications that warrant strict scrutiny. 
In Nguyen v. I.N.S., for example, the Court 
upheld a legislative scheme imposing more 
onerous burdens on unwed fathers than 
unwed mothers to prove the citizenship of 
their foreign-born children because of the 
opportunity for mothers to develop a 
relationship with their child at childbirth. 
The Court recognized important government 
interests in ensuring both a biological 
relationship between the citizen and the 
child and an opportunity to develop a 
meaningful parent-child relationship. The 
Court stressed the government's critically 
important “interest in ensuring some 
opportunity for a tie between citizen father 
and foreign born child” as a proxy for the 
opportunity for connection childbirth affords 
the mother. Nguyen suggests that when it 
comes to procreation, gender can be 
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considered and that biological relationships 
are significant interests. 
Nor is the State precluded from considering 
procreation in regulating marriage. Merely 
because the Court has discussed marriage as 
a fundamental right apart from procreation 
or other rights including contraception, child 
rearing, and education does not suggest that 
the link between marriage and procreation 
may not be considered when the State 
regulates marriage. The Court's listing of 
various rights from time to time is intended 
to be illustrative of cases upholding a right 
of privacy, ensuring that certain personal 
decisions might be made “without 
unjustified government 
interference.” Indeed, it is difficult to 
separate marriage from procreation 
considering the State's interest in regulating 
both. Even in Turner, where the Court 
discussed marriage as a fundamental right 
for inmates based upon other advantages of 
marriage, the Court explained that “most 
inmate marriages are formed in the 
expectation that they will ultimately be fully 
consummated” and mentioned the advantage 
of “legitimation of children born out of 
wedlock.” It goes without saying that there 
are procreative and personal dimensions of 
marriage, but a state may place greater 
emphasis on one or the other as it regulates 
marriage without violating the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
It is also undeniable that the State has an 
important interest in ensuring the well-being 
of resulting offspring, be they planned or 
unplanned. To that end, the State can offer 
marriage and its benefits to encourage 
unmarried parents to marry and married 
parents to remain so. Thus, the State could 
seek to limit the marriage benefit to 
opposite-gender couples completely apart 
from history and tradition. Far more 
opposite-gender couples will produce and 
care for children than same-gender couples 
and perpetuation of the species depends 
upon procreation. Consistent with the 
greatest good for the greatest number, the 
State could rationally and sincerely believe 
that children are best raised by two parents 
of opposite gender (including their 
biological parents) and that the present 
arrangement provides the best incentive for 
that outcome. Accordingly, the State could 
seek to preserve the clarity of what marriage 
represents and not extend it. 
Of course, other states may disagree. And it 
is always possible to argue that there are 
exceptions. But on this issue we should 
defer. To be sure, the constant refrain in 
these cases has been that the States' 
justifications are not advanced by excluding 
same-gender couples from marriage. But 
that is a matter of opinion; any 
“improvement” on the classification should 
be left to the state political process. 
At the very least, same-gender marriage is a 
new social phenomenon with unknown 
outcomes and the State could choose to 
exercise caution. Utah's justifications for not 
extending marriage to include same-gender 
couples are not irrefutable. But they don't 
need to be; they need only be based upon 
“any reasonably conceivable state of facts.” 
In conducting this analysis, we must defer to 
the predictive judgments of the electorate 
and the legislature and those judgments need 
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not be based upon complete, empirical 
evidence. 
No matter how many times we are reminded 
that (1) procreative ability and effective 
parenting are not prerequisites to opposite-
gender marriage (exclusion of same-gender 
couples is under-inclusive), (2) it is doubtful 
that the behavior of opposite-gender couples 
is affected by same-gender marriage (lack of 
evidence), (3) the evidence is equivocal 
concerning the effects of gender diversity on 
parenting (lack of evidence) and (4) the 
present scheme disadvantages the children 
of same-gender couples (exclusion is over-
inclusive), the State's classification does not 
need to be perfect. It can be under-inclusive 
and over-inclusive and need only arguably 
serve the justifications urged by the State. It 
arguably does. 
That the Constitution does not compel the 
State to recognize same-gender marriages 
within its own borders demonstrates a 
fortiori that it need not recognize those 
solemnized without. Unlike the federal 
government in Windsor, a state has the 
“historic and essential authority to define the 
marital relation” as applied to its residents 
and citizens. To that end, Utah has the 
authority to decline to recognize valid 
marriages from other states that are 
inconsistent with its public policy choices. 
To conclude otherwise would nationalize the 
regulation of marriage, thereby forcing each 
state “to substitute the statutes of other states 
for its own statutes dealing with a subject 
matter concerning which it is competent to 
legislate.” Such a result runs in direct 
contravention of the law of comity between 
states and its uncontroversial corollary that 
marriage laws necessarily vary from state to 
state. 
The State has satisfied its burden on rational 
basis review. One only need consider the 
reams of sociological evidence urged by the 
parties and the scores of amicus briefs on 
either side to know that the State's position 
is (at the very least) arguable. It most 
certainly is not arbitrary, irrational, or based 
upon legislative facts that no electorate or 
legislature could conceivably believe. 
Though the Plaintiffs would weigh the 
interests of the State differently and discount 
the procreation, child-rearing, and caution 
rationales, that prerogative belongs to the 
electorate and their representatives.  
We should resist the temptation to become 
philosopher-kings, imposing our views 
under the guise of constitutional 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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“The Marriage Ruling ‘Streak’ and What It Means, Made Simple” 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
August 12, 2014 
 
In sports, a “streak” can say a lot about 
talent, endurance — and plain luck.  Cal 
Ripken, Jr., of the Baltimore Orioles set a 
major league baseball record by playing in 
2,632 consecutive games.  The University of 
Connecticut’s women’s basketball team 
owns the longest string of victories in the 
college basketball ranks — ninety games in 
a row. 
In law, attorney Thurgood Marshall had a 
string of victories (sometimes interrupted by 
defeats) in his campaign to achieve racial 
desegregation in public education, and 
attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg did much the 
same in advancing the women’s rights 
revolution.  But perhaps nothing in 
constitutional history matches the swiftly 
developing “streak” of court rulings in favor 
of same-sex marriage.  Still, the actual 
meaning of that “streak” is open to debate 
— even about whether it is a streak.  Let’s 
try to sort it out, simply. 
First, what are we talking about 
here?  Courts have been issuing decisions 
about the government’s power to ban same-
sex marriage since 1993, in a Hawaii case, 
but that didn’t actually work out to permit 
such marriages.  In fact, that ruling, 
favorable to the idea, produced just the 
opposite:  a swift and long-running 
backlash, a wave of federal and state laws 
and state constitutional amendments 
reinforcing long-standing opposition to gays 
and lesbians seeking to wed. 
If one starts with a ruling by the highest 
state court in Massachusetts in 2003, a 
decision that did actually open marriage to 
same-sex couples (the first such ruling with 
a definite effect), there has been a steady 
trend strongly in that direction, but it has not 
been continuous. 
What most people have been talking about 
lately has been a line of court decisions that 
have come down over the past thirteen-plus 
months.  The starting point in that cycle was 
the Supreme Court’s decision in United 
States v. Windsor, in late June of last year. 
In that ruling, the Court struck down a key 
part of a 1996 federal law, the Defense of 
Marriage Act — one of the laws that had 
been prompted by the Hawaii court decision 
three years before.  The Court nullified a 
provision in the law that allowed federal 
marital benefits to go only to opposite-sex 
couples.  Those benefits, the Court majority 
said, must be available to same-sex couples 
who were legally married under their own 
state laws — for example, in Massachusetts, 
or other states that had since chosen to allow 
such unions. 
The Windsor decision, however, actually 
decided nothing about whether states could 
do what the federal law had done — that is, 
limit marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.  Even so, the opinion did say many 
favorable things about the need to show 
respect for the families of same-sex married 
couples. 
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In the wake of that decision, a “streak” 
supposedly has developed, with court after 
court, at federal and state levels, declaring 
that the Windsor decision undermined state 
bans on same-sex marriage and striking 
those bans down. 
In most public discussion, it has been said 
— on this blog, too — that there had been 
an unbroken string of court victories for 
same-sex marriage.  But this week, a state 
judge in Tennessee appeared to have broken 
that string by upholding his state’s ban in a 
same-sex couple’s divorce case. 
The reality, which also has just become 
clear, is that the “streak” never really got 
started as a string of winning decisions for 
same-sex marriage.  It is a fact that the first 
court ruling to apply the Windsor decision 
came in a New Jersey trial court in 
September 2013, nullifying a state ban, but 
that was mainly an expansion of an earlier, 
pre-Windsor ruling by the state’s Supreme 
Court.  The first court ruling to start from 
scratch on the issue went the other way; a 
state judge in Mississippi — in a same-
sex divorce case — on December 6 
dismissed a constitutional challenge to that 
state’s ban.  It was only a two-page order, so 
no one can be sure what reasons the judge 
had. 
The string of victories that would in fact 
come after the Windsor decision started on 
December 19, with a ruling by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court, although that 
decision relied on the New Mexico 
constitution to nullify that state’s ban. 
Then, one by one, federal and state courts 
began applying the Windsor decision 
directly to strike down state bans under the 
federal Constitution.  (Even that string was 
interrupted in May, when a state judge in 
Tampa dismissed a same-sex marriage 
divorce case, seeking to challenge that 
state’s ban.  Later, four state judges in other 
courts in Florida would rule in favor of 
same-sex marriage.) 
But, even if the “streak” has not been an 
unbroken one, the pace and frequency of the 
decisions that did go against the state bans 
is, surely, unprecedented.  Although groups 
that have been closely monitoring the string 
of rulings do disagree on the actual number 
of victories for same-sex marriage, it is 
somewhere around thirty, or more. 
What the occasional breaks in the “streak” 
illustrate, though, is that the outcome is not 
necessarily predictable as other courts take 
on the question, and an ultimate Supreme 
Court decision in favor of same-sex 
marriage is hardly inevitable. 
But then does the “streak,” such as it is, 
have any real meaning?  It certainly 
does.  As the number of rulings won by 
same-sex couples has risen, judges later 
joining in the trend have relied upon the 
strength of that trend.  Each judge is obliged 
to decide the issue individually, but most of 
them recognize a consensus when they see 
one as vivid as this one has been. 
Moreover, the strength of the trend has also 
led attorney generals in several states to 
decide that a defense of their state’s ban is 
no longer a promising strategy, and they 
have given up that defense.  Others in favor 
of the bans have tried to step up to make a 
defense, but that has had its limits. 
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The “streak” also has created a lower-court 
record that, even if it does not produce the 
same result each time, will surely impress 
the Supreme Court when it finally allows 
itself to be drawn into the fray.  Some 
historians have said that they know of no 
instance when the Court has bucked a trend 
such as this one has become. 
But the very nature of that trend can also be 
an argument against the Supreme Court 
choosing to get involved itself.  If the only 
breaks in the “streak” have been a handful of 
rulings by divorce-court judges, none of 
whom so far has gone deeply into the issue 
before ruling, the Court could conclude that 
the issue is working itself out sufficiently in 
lower courts. 
The Court is often led to take on a 
controversy if the lower courts have split — 
at least when such splits are vivid and 
meaningful.  The supporters of bans on 
same-sex marriage have been arguing that 
there is already a split of that significance on 
this issue, despite the “streak.”  They are 
relying on the fact that the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2006 
explicitly upheld Nebraska’s ban on such 
marriages, and they also cite a string of state 
supreme court decisions against same-sex 
marriage pleas. 
Every one of those decisions, though, came 
out before the Supreme Court decision in the 
Windsor case.  If that ruling changed the 
constitutional landscape, as so many judges 
have since concluded, the Supreme Court 
could conclude that a current split would 
provide a more compelling reason to take on 
the question. 
A number of observers who listened to 
hearings held last week in the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came away 
with a clear impression that a majority of 
that three-judge panel might well uphold one 
or more of the state bans in effect in the four 
states involved in that hearing. 
That kind of a break in the current “streak” 
would certainly demonstrate that there is a 
real division of opinion on the question, one 
that it would take a Supreme Court decision 
to resolve. 
Of course, the existence of a genuine split 
on a major constitutional question such as 
this one does not necessarily dictate that the 
Court will be drawn in.  The Justices do not 
agree to settle every lower-court conflict, by 
any means.  They have almost complete 
discretion in what to put on their docket for 
decision. 
One thing about the “streak” does appear to 
be quite clear at the moment.  Its pace has 
been such that the Supreme Court is likely to 
act on one or more cases soon after it returns 
to Washington in September, ending its 
summer recess.  Any grant of review early 
in the Term would almost certainly mean a 
final decision by next summer. 
It that were to happen, it would be a 
remarkable historic journey: 
from Windsor to a definitive ruling on same-
sex marriage in just two years’ time.
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“Comparing Two Federal Appellate Court Decisions on Same-Sex Marriage” 
Verdict 
David S. Kemp 
July 30, 2014 
 
On Monday, a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that 
Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriages in that 
state violates the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This 
decision follows closely on the heels of a 
decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which came 
to the same conclusion just over a month 
ago with respect to Utah’s same-sex 
marriage ban. 
In this column, I examine the Fourth Circuit 
panel majority’s reasoning striking down 
Virginia’s ban and compare that with the 
reasoning employed by the Tenth Circuit 
panel that struck Utah’s similar law last 
month. I note that the majority opinions 
from both courts closely track one another, 
both in precedents cited and in reasoning. I 
also discuss the similarities and differences 
between the dissenting opinions and argue 
that these dissenting opinions likely indicate 
the focal points of these cases if and when 
they reach the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Bostic v. Schaefer: The Fourth Circuit 
Strikes Down Virginia’s Same-Sex 
Marriage Ban 
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit held Monday that Virginia’s 
constitutional and statutory bans on same-
sex marriage are unconstitutional. In a 2-1 
decision, the panel quickly disposed of the 
arguments put forth by the proponents of the 
law, making it the second federal appeals 
court this summer to rule against a state’s 
same-sex marriage ban. 
The panel first considered the threshold 
question whether the plaintiffs had judicial 
standing to bring their claims in federal 
court at all. Finding that they had, the court 
turned to a second preliminary question: 
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary 
dismissal of a case in 1972 “for want of a 
substantial federal question” precluded the 
instant case. That prior case, Baker v. 
Nelson, involved an appeal from the 
Minnesota Supreme Court upholding a ban 
on same-sex marriage. Summary dismissals 
are considered to be rulings on the merits, 
but they do not carry the same precedential 
value as an opinion after briefing and oral 
arguments. They do, however, prevent lower 
courts from “coming to opposite conclusions 
on the precise issues presented and 
necessarily decided by those actions” except 
“when doctrinal developments indicate 
otherwise.” The majority found that the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawrence v. 
Texas, in 2003, and United States v. 
Windsor, a decade later, constituted such 
doctrinal developments. Thus, it 
concluded, Baker was no longer binding. 
The panel then turned to the opponents’ 
Fourteenth Amendment arguments. First, it 
considered the appropriate level of 
constitutional scrutiny: rational basis review 
or some form of heightened scrutiny. The 
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laws’ opponents argued that the ban 
infringes on their right to marriage, which 
the Supreme Court has recognized as a 
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny. 
The proponents agreed that marriage is a 
fundamental right, but argued that the 
fundamental right to marriage does not 
encompass a right to same-sex marriage and 
thus that the law triggers only rational basis 
review. The panel found that the Supreme 
Court’s precedents on the fundamental right 
to marriage do not define the rights in 
question as “the right to interracial 
marriage,” “the right of people owing child 
support to marry,” and “the right of prison 
inmates to marry”; rather these seminal 
cases speak of “a broad right to marry that is 
not circumscribed based on the 
characteristics of the individuals seeking to 
exercise that right.” Thus, the panel held, the 
right to marriage encompasses the right to 
marry the person of one’s choosing and 
therefore includes the right to same-sex 
marriage. Finding that the law implicated 
the fundamental right of marriage, the panel 
applied strict scrutiny. Under this level of 
review, the government must show that the 
laws in question are narrowly tailored and 
necessary to further compelling state 
interests. 
The law’s proponents put forth five interests 
that they argued justified the laws: “(1) 
Virginia’s federalism-based interest in 
maintaining control over the definition of 
marriage within its borders, (2) the history 
and tradition of opposite-sex marriage, (3) 
protecting the institution of marriage, (4) 
encouraging responsible procreation, and (5) 
promoting the optimal childrearing 
environment.” Even assuming that each of 
these reasons was indeed compelling, the 
panel still found that the laws prohibiting 
same-sex marriage were not sufficiently 
narrowly tailored to further any of these 
interests. 
In reaching its conclusion that Virginia’s 
ban on same-sex marriage violates the 
Constitution, the panel notably placed great 
weight on the Supreme Court’s language 
in Lawrence and Windsor recognizing the 
equal legitimacy of gay couples’ intimate 
relationships. 
Comparison to the Tenth Circuit’s 
Decision in Kitchen v. Herbert 
At the end of June, a panel of the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued 
a similar ruling striking down Utah’s same-
sex marriage ban. In that case, the majority 
also found that the plaintiffs had standing to 
challenge the state law and that Baker v. 
Nelson was no longer binding authority. 
The law’s proponents provided four 
allegedly compelling state interests: “(1) 
fostering a child-centric marriage culture 
that encourages parents to subordinate their 
own interests to the needs of their children; 
(2) children being raised by their biological 
mothers and fathers—or at least by a 
married mother and father—in a stable 
home; (3) ensuring adequate reproduction; 
and (4) accommodating religious freedom 
and reducing the potential for civic strife.” 
The Tenth Circuit panel’s reasoning was 
very similar to that of the Fourth Circuit 
panel, albeit more directly critical of the 
law. The panel questioned the state’s 
purported interests, stating that “each of the 
appellants’ justifications rests fundamentally 
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on a sleight of hand in which same-sex 
marriage is used as a proxy for a different 
characteristic shared by both same-sex and 
some opposite-sex couples.” However, even 
assuming the interests are compelling, the 
panel found the argument “that procreative 
couples must be channeled into committed 
relationships in order to promote the State’s 
interests in childbearing and optimal 
childrearing . . . fails because the prohibition 
on same-sex marriage has an insufficient 
causal connection to the State’s articulated 
goals.” 
I found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning 
somewhat more thoroughly explained and 
supported as to the question whether same-
sex marriage is encompassed in the 
fundamental right to marriage, particularly 
in that it more directly relied on Loving v. 
Virginia to reach its conclusion. 
The Dissenting Opinions 
Judge Paul Kelly concurred in part and 
dissented in part with the Tenth Circuit 
panel majority. He concurred only with 
respect to the issue of standing and dissented 
with respect to the treatment of Baker v. 
Nelson as no longer binding, the conclusion 
that same-sex marriage is encompassed 
within the fundamental right to marry (and 
therefore he concluded that under the 
rational basis test, the law should be 
upheld). 
Judge Paul Niemeyer dissented from the 
Fourth Circuit panel’s majority opinion and 
argued that the fundamental right to 
marry does not include a right to marry 
someone of the same sex. 
While Baker v. Nelson is certainly important 
and a determination of its applicability may 
ultimately affect the outcome of the issue if 
it reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, the scope 
of the fundamental right to marry is at the 
crux of both cases, as the two dissents 
illustrate. 
It seems to me disingenuous to deny the 
strong parallels between these cases 
and Loving. The dissents both contend that 
the fundamental right to marry is 
distinguishable from a right to marry 
someone of the same sex, and that the latter 
is a “new” right that departs from history 
and tradition. Yet at the same time, they 
deny that Loving involved a 
similar  departure, even though marriage had 
historically been denied to interracial 
couples. 
To attempt to characterize same-sex 
marriage as a category separate and apart 
from marriage as an institution is to ignore 
exactly what it is that gay couples seek—
recognition of their relationships as equal to 
those of straight couples. As Justice 
Kennedy wrote in Lawrence, and as quoted 
by the Tenth Circuit majority, the drafters of 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
“knew times can blind us to certain truths 
and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve 
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, 
persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater 
freedom.” 
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“Virginia Wants Gay Marriage Ban Review by Supreme Court” 
Bloomberg 
Andrew Harris 
August 8, 2014 
 
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, a 
first-term Democrat and supporter of 
marriage equality, said he asked the U.S. 
Supreme Court to review a ruling that struck 
down a gay marriage ban in his state in 
order to get a quick final word on the issue. 
Herring’s request, announced in a statement 
today, would be the third such bid lodged 
with the high court this week, following 
requests by lawyers defending similar 
measures in Utah and Oklahoma. Herring’s 
petition wasn’t immediately available at the 
court. 
Laws barring gay couples from marrying in 
the three states were struck down by federal 
judges, in rulings that were upheld by 
appeals courts. The Supreme Court has 
discretion to accept cases for review. Other 
challenges involving gay marriage bans are 
before U.S. appeals courts in Cincinnati, 
Chicago and San Francisco. 
Several Supreme Court justices have 
expressed reluctance to tackle the issue, with 
Anthony Kennedy and Sonia Sotomayor 
suggesting in a separate gay-rights case last 
year that it’d be too soon for a high court 
ruling. Likening the Virginia ban to its one-
time prohibition of interracial marriage, 
Herring said, “Virginia got that case wrong. 
Now we have a chance to get it right.” 
Almost There 
“Many brave men and women have fought 
for years for the constitutional guarantee of 
marriage equality, and now, we are almost 
there,” Herring said. 
Same-sex marriage is legal in 19 states and 
the District of Columbia. Decisions striking 
down bans in nine states are on hold pending 
the outcome of appeals. 
Each side in the Virginia case has asked the 
U.S. appeals court in Richmond to delay its 
decision pending a resolution by the 
Supreme Court, a spokesman for Herring, 
Michael Kelly, said today. 
Less than a month into his term, Herring 
announced his office would reverse the 
position of his Republican predecessor, 
Kenneth Cucinnelli. The new attorney 
general argued for his state’s law to be 
declared unconstitutional and then for the 
ruling to be upheld on appeal. 
Law Defender 
Defending the law was Norfolk County 
court clerk George E. Schaefer and Prince 
William County court clerk Michele 
McQuigg. 
Nick Bouknight, a spokesman for the 
Scottsdale, Arizona-based Alliance 
Defending Freedom, whose lawyers 
represented McQuigg, declined to comment 
on whether the group would ask the 
Supreme Court to review the Virginia case. 
Jeffrey Brooke, an attorney for Schaefer, 
didn’t immediately return a call seeking 
comment. 
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The cases are Bostic v. Schaefer, 14-1167, 
Bostic v. Rainey, 14-1169 and Bostic v. 
McQuigg, 14-1173, U.S. Court of Appeals, 
Fourth Circuit (Richmond). 
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“Supreme Court Blocks Virginia Same-Sex Marriages” 
Washington Blade 
Chris Johnson 
August 20, 2014 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to a stay 
Wednesday on a federal appeals court’s 
ruling against Virginia’s ban on same-sex 
marriage, blocking same-sex marriages from 
taking place this week in the Old Dominion. 
Without explanation, the court announced 
in a single-page order it has stayed the ruling 
by the U.S. Fourth Circuit of Appeals in 
Schaefer v. Bostic, which affirmed 
Virginia’s prohibition on same-sex marriage 
is unconstitutional. 
Although Chief Justice John Roberts is 
responsible for stay requests in the Fourth 
Circuit, the order indicates he referred the 
matter to the entire court. The vote by the 
Supreme Court on the decision isn’t 
included in the order. 
The court adds that if the court ends up 
declining a writ of certiorari to hear the case, 
the stay will terminate automatically. But if 
the court decides to hear the case, the stay 
will continue until judgment is issued. 
Had the court declined to issue a stay, 
clerks’ offices in Virginia could have started 
distributing marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples at 8 am on Thursday. That’s when 
the Fourth Circuit was set to issue the 
mandate on its decision. 
Evan Wolfson, president of Freedom to 
Marry, said the stay decision from the 
Supreme Court “underscores of the 
urgency” of a national resolution in favor of 
marriage equality. 
“Americans across the country are being 
deprived of the freedom to marry and 
respect for their lawful marriages, as well as 
the tangible protections and precious dignity 
and happiness that marriage brings,” 
Wolfson said. “It is time for the Supreme 
Court to affirm what more than thirty courts 
have held in the past year: marriage 
discrimination violates the Constitution, 
harms families, and is unworthy of 
America.” 
The Supreme Court halted same-sex 
marriages in Virginia after Prince William 
County Circuit Court Clerk Michèle 
McQuigg, who’s defending the state’s ban 
on same-sex marriage in court, requested the 
stay from justices. Attorneys representing 
same-sex couples in the lawsuit — both the 
Bostic and the Harris plaintiffs — had asked 
the court to decline the stay, but the 
Commonwealth of Virginia on behalf of 
Virginia Registrar of Deeds Janet Rainey 
filed a brief agreeing that a stay should be 
put in place. 
Prior to the announcement from the 
Supreme Court, the anti-gay legal firm 
Alliance Defending Freedom, which is 
defending Virginia’s marriage ban on behalf 
of McQuigg, followed up with a response 
insisting that a stay on the Fourth Circuit 
decision is necessary to prevent harm to the 
state. 
“The balance of the harms thus reduces to 
this: the Bostic and Harris Respondents 
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have identified potential harms (e.g., a delay 
in obtaining state recognition of their 
relationships) that will result only if they 
ultimately prevail in this case, whereas 
Clerk McQuigg and Registrar Rainey have 
identified certain harms (e.g., enjoining a 
duly enacted state constitutional provision) 
that will result as soon as the Fourth Circuit 
issues its mandate,” writes senior counsel 
Byron Babione. “That balance tips sharply 
in favor of staying the Fourth Circuit’s 
mandate.” 
The litigation seeking same-sex marriage in 
Virginia itself has already been appealed to 
the Supreme Court. Earlier this month, 
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, 
who has refused to defend Virginia’s 
marriage law in court, filed an appeal on 
behalf of the state. Alliance Defending 
Freedom has already pledged to file a 
similar appeal seeking to uphold the ban. 
Following the decision from the Supreme 
Court, Herring said in a conference call with 
reporters he wants an expedited resolution to 
the case, which is why he already petitioned 
the Supreme Court to review the Fourth 
Circuit’s decision against the marriage law. 
“It’s still difficult to expect Virginian folk to 
wait to exercise what I believe is a 
fundamental right, especially when we are 
so close to our goal, and that is why I’ve 
been pushing to expedite and get a ruling 
from the Supreme Court that will 
definitively answer the constitutional 
questions about marriage equality and 
permanently protect the families of 
Virginia’s same-sex couples,” Herring said. 
Asked by the Washington Blade to respond 
to critics who would say it’s disingenuous to 
call Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage 
unconstitutional on one hand, but support a 
stay on a ruling against it on the other, 
Herring emphasized he’s pushing for a 
speedy resolution to the case in favor of 
same-sex couples. 
“I support and will continue to fight for 
equal treatment under the law, and I’m 
going to continue to do that,” Herring said. 
“But at the same, I recognize that until the 
Supreme Court makes its decision that 
outcome is not certain. So, to those who are 
tired of their state not treating them fairly 
and equally, I am working as hard as I can to 
fight for equality. I worked for it in the 
district court, I fought for it in the Fourth 
Circuit and I’ll fight for it in the Supreme 
Court.” 
The American Foundation for Equal Rights 
announced after the stay decision was 
announced that it’ll file a brief in support of 
the petition already filed by Virginia 
Attorney General Mark Herring calling on 
the Supreme Court to take up the case. 
“The federal court system agrees, the 
majority of Americans agree, and the 
President of the United States agrees that it 
is time this country treats its same-sex 
couples and their children just the same as 
all other loving families,” said plaintiffs’ 
lead co-counsel David Boies of Boies, 
Schiller & Flexner, LLP. “We are confident 
that when the Supreme Court reviews the 
Bostic case, it too will agree and end the 
flagrant injustice of segregating Americans 
based on sexual orientation.” 
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The decision to block the same-sex 
marriages from occurring overturns a 
decision from the Fourth Circuit, which 
refused to grant a stay on its decision 
striking down Virginia’s marriage ban. 
But the high court’s decision to stay same-
sex marriages in Virginia is consistent with 
other stay decisions it has issued in other 
states following rulings in favor of marriage 
equality. 
In January, the court issued a stay on same-
sex marriages taking place in Utah as a 
result of a district court ruling in the case of 
Kitchen v. Herbert striking down the state’s 
ban on gay nuptials. Additionally, the 
court halted state recognition of these 1,300 
marriages in Evans v. Utah after the U.S. 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the 
state for the time being should consider 
them valid. 
Chris Gasek, senior fellow at the anti-gay 
Family Research Council, claimed the 
Supreme Court’s decision to stay same-sex 
marriages in Virginia as a victory for 
opponents of marriage equality. 
“Today, the Supreme Court put a hold on 
the Fourth Circuit ruling, allowing 
Virginia’s law to continue to be enforced 
while the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is 
appealed,” Gasek said. “We are glad that the 
Court saw the wisdom of slowing down the 
judicial process in this instance so that 
marriages will not be entered into that would 
later have to be nullified. Such irresponsible 
mayhem has been witnessed in Utah, and it 
resulted in legal chaos for state residents and 
state officials.”
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“Fourth Circuit Calls Virginia’s Gay Marriage Ban “Segregation,” Strikes it 
Down” 
Slate 
Mark Joseph Stern 
July 28, 2014 
On Monday, the 4
th
 Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruled that Virginia’s gay marriage 
ban is unconstitutional, the latest victory for 
marriage equality in a unbroken string of 
triumphs since the Supreme 
Court overturned DOMA in 2013. The 
opinion included no stay; until the Supreme 
Court steps in, then, gay couples in Virginia 
may get married starting now. 
The judges of the 2–1 majority labeled the 
state’s ban “segregation” and held that, 
because it targeted a disfavored minority and 
implicated a fundamental right, it should be 
subject to strict scrutiny. It’s clear that, to 
the majority, laws like Virginia’s represent 
little more than bald bigotry: 
[I]nertia and apprehension are not 
legitimate bases for denying same-
sex couples due process and equal 
protection of the laws. Civil marriage 
is one of the cornerstones of our way 
of life. It allows individuals to 
celebrate and publicly declare their 
intentions to form lifelong 
partnerships, which provide 
unparalleled intimacy, 
companionship, emotional support, 
and security. The choice of whether 
and whom to marry is an intensely 
personal decision that alters the 
course of an individual’s life. 
Denying same-sex couples this 
choice prohibits them from 
participating fully in our society, 
which is precisely the type of 
segregation that the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot countenance. 
Although the court struck down only 
Virginia’s marriage ban, the 4th Circuit also 
has jurisdiction over Maryland, West 
Virginia, South Carolina, and North 
Carolina. The latter three states still ban gay 
marriage—but today’s ruling throws those 
laws in serious jeopardy. 
The majority opinion, written by Judge 
Henry Franklin Floyd and joined by Judge 
Roger Gregory, is most notable for its 
systematic dismantling of Virginia’s 
painfully prejudiced, laughably lousy 
arguments against gay marriage. The state 
centered its arguments around the idea that 
because gay couples cannot have biological 
children together, they simply don’t deserve 
to get married. When asked why infertile 
straight couples can still marry, the state 
responded that these couples set a “positive 
example for couples who can have 
unintended children, encouraging them to 
marry.” Here’s Floyd on this puzzling 
theory: 
We see no reason why committed 
same-sex couples cannot serve as 
similar role models. … Allowing 
infertile opposite-sex couples to 
marry does nothing to further the 
government’s goal of channeling 
procreative conduct into marriage. 
Thus, excluding same-sex couples 
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from marriage due to their inability 
to have unintended children makes 
little sense. 
Floyd also had some fun with Virginia’s 
other major argument—the claim that gay 
marriage somehow increases out-of-wedlock 
births among straight people, a societal ill 
since children do better with married 
parents. The idea that gay marriage spurs 
out-of-wedlock births, the court rightly 
notes, is pure nonsense, bigoted magical 
thinking barely concealed as legalistic 
casuistry. But the second half of the state’s 
formulation is quite true: Children do tend to 
do better with married parents. Thus, 
Virginia’s marriage ban 
actually harms children, denying them the 
right to have legally wedded parents. 
In his bitter dissent, Judge Paul Niemeyer 
edges toward what we might call full Scalia, 
repeatedly demeaning the value of gay 
people’s relationships and families. Gay 
marriage bans, Niemeyer writes, are 
necessary to secure “stable family units” and 
to “giv[e] children an identity.” Without gay 
marriage bans, the “political order resulting 
from [these] stable family units” will be 
shattered, and states may be forced to 
recognize “polygamous or incestuous 
relationships.” 
This last quote directly cites Scalia—in 
dissent. That’s what so odd about 
Niemeyer’s decision: As an appellate judge, 
he’s bound by the Supreme Court’s 
precedent. That precedent insists that a gay 
marriage ban “demeans the [gay] couple, 
whose moral and sexual choices the 
Constitution protects,” violating “basic due 
process and equal protection principles.” But 
Niemeyer seems to be living in a world 
where Scalia’s dissents became law and the 
state retains unfettered power to disparage 
gay people’s lives. Luckily for us, Scalia’s 
dissents were just dissents—as is 
Niemeyer’s opinion. Welcome to the fold, 
Virginia. 
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“Reading the Court’s Signals on Same-Sex Marriage” 
SCOTUSblog 
Lyle Denniston 
August 22, 2014 
 
Since early this year, the Supreme Court has 
stepped back into the same-sex marriage 
controversy five times.  While it has done 
little to explain those actions, it has sent 
some signals about its thinking.  Its most 
important signals may have been those it 
appeared to have sent Wednesday, in putting 
off the issuance of marriage licenses to 
same-sex couples in Virginia. 
Between the nine lines of that order, the 
Court implied that it will not be rushed into 
a decision about which, if any, cases it is 
going to review.  And it left no doubt that 
the Justices themselves, not the lawyers or 
their clients, are in charge of the 
timing.  The Court, in short, has not yet 
gotten caught up in the race to settle the 
basic constitutional issue just as soon as it 
could possibly do so. 
The Court actually has said very little in the 
nearly fourteen months since its five-to-four 
decision in United States v. Windsor – the 
ruling that did not deal with state power to 
ban same-sex marriage but is being widely 
interpreted by most lower courts as if it had 
very much to do with that.  It has not 
granted any cases on the validity of a state 
ban, and it has not even hinted — at least 
not reliably — at what it might eventually 
decide on the point. 
The Virginia order, granting a county clerk’s 
plea to head off the issuance of marriage 
licenses to same-sex couples that would 
have started the next morning, is the only 
one of the five actions the Justices have 
taken that will help shape their own eventual 
role in confronting the basic 
controversy.  All of the other four 
dealt only with the situations in lower 
courts. 
The Court had been urged, by all sides in the 
Virginia case, to speed up the process of 
finding a case for review by turning a simple 
request for delay into an actual, formal 
petition — a move that could have cut short 
several procedural steps, and set up the 
Virginia case as a prime candidate for 
review. 
The Court silently refused the suggestion, 
simply delaying things in Virginia until after 
a county clerk actually files a petition for 
review, in the usual form and on the usual 
timetable.  That was a clear sign that the 
Court was doing its best to act as if it were 
business as usual, even on this hot 
constitutional controversy. 
That development might well have slowed 
down not only the county clerk’s petition, 
but also the one already filed by state 
officials in Virginia, which had seemed 
likely to be in shape procedurally for early 
consideration for possible 
review.   Knowing that another petition 
involving the Virginia ban is on the way, the 
Court may wait for it before acting on the 
state’s separate petition. 
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Unless the pace steps up significantly on 
Virginia’s part of this controversy, the 
petition by Virginia officials may lag behind 
the one filed by Utah — one that seems to 
be accelerating.  The Utah case, in fact, 
might be ready for the Court to examine as 
early as next week or the week after — that 
is, if the Court were in town, and in session, 
and not on summer recess. 
The Court, however, has given no sign that 
it is going to take any definite action on the 
new same-sex marriage cases, at least until it 
returns to town in September from the recess 
that began at the beginning of 
July.  Yesterday’s order, in fact, tended to 
reinforce that outlook. 
But what of the other four orders the Court 
has issued this year – one in January, one in 
June, and two in July?  Any messages there? 
Two of the orders — on January 6 and July 
18 — delayed decisions by federal district 
courts until the Tenth Circuit could consider 
appeals of those decisions.  In those cases, 
the trial judges struck down Utah’s ban on 
new same-sex marriages and the separate 
ban on the state’s refusal to recognize 
existing same-sex marriages.  Later, the 
Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling against the 
new marriage ban; the other case, on 
recognition of existing marriages, awaits 
review in that court. 
In both cases, it was the state that asked to 
delay implementation of the trial judges’ 
rulings.  By granting those pleas, the Court 
implied that it wanted an orderly review 
process in lower courts, and was 
sympathetic to the claim of state officials 
that chaos might ensue if same-sex couples 
were free to marry when the constitutional 
controversy remained unsettled.  (There 
have, in fact, been hundreds of same-sex 
marriages in intervals between lower court 
rulings, and their validity remains 
uncertain.) 
Although many defenders of state bans have 
interpreted those two orders as signaling that 
the Court itself was likely to grant review of 
the issue later, and, indeed, that there was a 
good chance that the Court would overturn 
the lower court decisions and uphold the 
bans, only the former was probably an 
intended message.  The merits of the 
decision are just too weighty for the Court to 
be sending signals on how it would rule 
when a case became fully developed before 
it. 
But no one knows for sure, because neither 
of those orders was explained by the 
Justices, and there were no noted dissents by 
any of the nine members of the Court. 
The other two orders from the Justices came 
on June 4, dealing with a trial judge’s ruling 
striking down an Oregon ban, and on July 9, 
involving a trial judge’s ruling against a ban 
in Pennsylvania.  In a sense, those didn’t 
really count:  in neither was the plea for 
delay made by state officials; in fact, 
officials in both Oregon and Pennsylvania 
had given up defending their states’ bans. 
In the first of those two cases, a private 
group that had been denied entry into the 
case wanted to mount a defense; in the 
second, a county clerk — who had no real 
authority over the state’s policy on marriage 
licenses and had been kept out of the case — 
wanted to put on a defense. 
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The full Court denied the Oregon plea, thus 
sending a clear signal that an “outsider” to a 
test case was not going to be given a chance 
to stand in for the state to defend a 
ban.  That, in fact, had been the actual 
decision the Court had issued on the same 
day that it issued the Windsor 
decision:  Hollingsworth v. Perry, barring an 
appeal by the proponents of the California 
ban, the ballot measure known as 
“Proposition 8.” 
That Oregon denial then was cited, by title 
only, as a precedent by Justice Samuel A. 
Alito, Jr., when he turned aside the 
Pennsylvania county clerk’s plea.  Again, 
the message was that this clerk, given the 
actual nature of her duties, was an 
“outsider.” 
(By the way, the Court had no problem in 
the Virginia case with the fact that the 
request for delay there also came from a 
county clerk.  In Virginia, county clerks are 
centrally involved in implementing the 
state’s policy on marriage licenses, and they 
have the authority to be in court on their 
own.  Indeed, the clerk – Michele B. 
McQuigg of Prince William County — was 
defending the ban after state officials 
switched the state’s position and gave up the 
defense that had been pursued by their 
predecessors in office.) 
There is no basis for the theory that, in those 
two orders, the Court was signaling that it 
supported a decision by state officials to 
abandon a defense of a state constitutional 
provision, or that it was implying that it 
thought the trial judges were right in 
nullifying the bans.  The only real message 
was that those who were asking for delay 
were not legally entitled to ask. 
Through all of this year, from January on, 
the Court could not help but be aware of 
what was happening in the lower courts, 
with a string of decisions nullifying state 
bans on same-sex marriage.  The fact 
that the Court has been drawn in on five 
occasions has kept it in the middle of the 
controversy, even if it has mostly kept its 
own counsel about what it is thinking. 
With a little more than five weeks until the 
Justices assemble in their first private 
Conference, in advance of the new Term 
starting October 6, it is by no means clear 
that any same-sex marriage case will be 
ready for the Justices to consider it on 
September 29.  That depends, in part, on 
whether the Court will have cases before it 
one at a time, as each is ready, or in a 
group., when several are ready. 
The last scheduled day for distributing a 
case for consideration by the Justices at the 
September 29 meeting is September 10 — 
now, just three weeks away.  The pending 
Utah case has a fair prospect of being ready 
then, but there is reason to doubt at this 
point that the pending Oklahoma and 
Virginia cases will be complete.  The 
lawyers involved have said they were 
working diligently to push matters along, 
but the clock is against them for action by 
the Justices at the outset of the new Term. 
There will be plenty of time, though, to get a 
case before the Court for decision during the 
new Term.  If a case is accepted for review 
by sometime next January, it is almost 
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certain to be decided before the end of 
the Term, late next June. 
Is a grant of review a certainty in coming 
months?  There is never a sufficiently strong 
advance signal to predict that. 
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“ACLU Opposes Time Extension in Utah’s Same-Sex Recognition Case” 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Marissa Lang 
August 19, 2014 
 
Four gay and lesbian couples asked a federal 
appeals court Tuesday to deny Utah extra 
time to appeal a judge’s order requiring the 
state to offer spousal benefits to same-sex 
couples married in Utah. 
The longer the appeal is dragged out, the 
couples’ attorney said, the more harm will 
be done. 
 "There are families who face financial, 
emotional and dignitary harms every single 
day [Utah] refuses to recognize their 
marriages," wrote John Mejía, counsel for 
the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah, 
which represents the plaintiffs in this case. 
"These real concrete harms mitigate strongly 
against any further extensions in this case." 
On Monday, the Utah attorney general’s 
office asked the 10th Circuit Court of 
Appeals for a one-month extension of the 
Sept. 22 deadline set by the court for the 
state’s appeal. 
Giving the state until Oct. 22 to appeal the 
Evans v. Utah lawsuit would allow the state 
to better brief the court, the state argued, 
given the "factually and legally complex" 
nature of the case, and the fact that the 
attorneys involved have a busy workload. 
But on Tuesday, the ACLU said that’s not 
good enough. 
"[Utah has] had since January of this year, 
when this case was filed, to deliberate about 
the issues presented here and have 
undoubtedly already done much of the 
required research and writing needed," 
Mejía wrote. "It also cannot be said that the 
defendants could not have foreseen the 
timing of the present briefing schedule to 
anticipate a need to shift resources and 
priorities." 
The Evans case is the state’s second legal 
battle over same-sex marriage to reach the 
10th Circuit, which in June upheld U.S. 
District Court Judge Robert J. Shelby’s 
historic decision in December on the 
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit that toppled 
Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage, allowing 
gay and lesbian couples to wed in Utah for a 
brief period of 17 days. 
After the nation’s high court halted all same-
sex marriages, giving the state a chance to 
appeal the ruling, Utah said its laws were 
returned to their "status quo" and it would be 
illegal for them to extend marital benefits to 
same-sex spouses. 
But in May, U.S. District Judge Dale A. 
Kimball ordered Utah to do just that. The 
judge found that denying these couples 
spousal benefits was a violation of their 
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal 
protection and due process. 
"The State has placed plaintiffs and their 
families in a state of legal limbo with respect 
to adoptions, child care and custody, 
medical decisions, employment and health 
benefits, future tax implications, inheritance, 
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and many other property and fundamental 
rights associated with marriage," Kimball 
wrote in his decision. "These legal 
uncertainties and lost rights cause harm each 
day that the marriage is not recognized." 
This argument was used again in the motion 
filed early Tuesday by the ACLU. 
A stay put in place by the U.S. Supreme 
Court blocked all movement toward doling 
out spousal benefits to married same-sex 
Utahns after Kimball and the 10th Circuit 
denied similar requests from the state. That 
stay will expire once the 10th Circuit has 
ruled on the lawsuit. 
It’s this indefinite hold that the ACLU said 
is hurting Utah families. 
"While Plaintiffs’ counsel understand the 
need for professional courtesy in agreeing to 
extension requests," Mejía wrote, "they are 
unable to do so when extensions will work 
tangible harm to their clients." 
Utah has contended that allowing same-sex 
couples to apply for, and receive, marital 
benefits would render the lawsuit moot and 
undermine the judicial process to which the 
state is entitled. 
Federal appeals court Judge Paul J. Kelly, 
who wrote a dissent when his colleagues 
Judges Carlos F. Lucero and Jerome A. 
Holmes refused to halt the granting of 
benefits to same-sex spouses, has asserted 
that the courts have been "running 
roughshod over state laws which are 
currently in force." 
"It is disingenuous to contend that the state 
will suffer no harm if the matter is not 
stayed," he wrote. 
Meanwhile, the state also continues to 
defend its right to define marriage as a union 
between one man and one woman by asking 
the U.S. Supreme Court to take up its 
Kitchen v. Herbert case — its last recourse 
in Utah’s effort to revive its ban on same-
sex marriage, Amendment 3, which Utah 
voters passed in 2004. 
Virginia and Oklahoma have filed similar 
petitions, and more states are expected to 
file for a hearing before the nation’s high 
court before the year’s end. 
The U.S. Supreme Court is on break until 
October. When the justices reconvene they 
will decide which case — if any — they 
may take up on the issue of state same-sex 
marriage legislation.
589 
 
“Utah Seeks U.S. Supreme Review to Revive Gay-Marriage Ban” 
Bloomberg 
Joel Rosenblatt 
August 6, 2014 
 
Utah asked the U.S. Supreme Court to 
revive its same-sex marriage ban, becoming 
the first state to do so since the high court 
last year struck down a law that barred the 
federal government from recognizing gay 
marriage. 
Since that pivotal ruling in June 2013, gay-
marriage advocates have tallied more than 
two dozen lower-court victories without a 
single defeat. Utah’s prohibition was the 
first in that spate of cases to be found 
unconstitutional by a federal appeals court. 
The 5-4 ruling in U.S. v. Windsor is the high 
court’s most definitive take on the 
constitutional rights of gay couples. Striking 
down a 1996 U.S. law that denied federal 
benefits to legally married same-sex 
spouses, the court’s majority said the 
measure created a “second-tier marriage” for 
gay couples. 
While courts have consistently read last 
year’s ruling as undercutting any rationale 
for state bans, Utah argued the opposite in 
yesterday’s petition for review. The state 
said the June decision by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals in Denver that its ban is 
unconstitutional runs afoul of the conclusion 
in the Windsor case that defining domestic 
relations belongs with the states. 
“There are dozens of cases that raise the 
question whether the Constitution dictates a 
single marriage definition,” according to 
Utah’s filing. “If Utah prevails here, the 
court will have necessarily concluded that 
Utah is ‘competent’ to define marriage” and 
the resolution of the case “can mark the end 
of marriage litigation in all respects.” 
Same-sex marriage is now allowed in 19 
states and the District of Columbia. 
Marriage Licenses 
Utah’s voter-approved ban was first struck 
down by a Salt Lake City federal judge on 
Dec. 20. More than 1,000 couples received 
marriage licenses from Dec. 23 to Jan. 6. 
After the Supreme Court put the ruling on 
hold to allow for an appeal, Utah refused to 
grant marital benefits to those couples, 
sparking even more litigation. 
In yesterday’s petition, Utah cited previous 
Supreme Court rulings that support states’ 
rights to define marriage. While defending 
its ban in lower courts the state emphasized 
that voters backed the 2004 law by an 
almost 2-1 margin. 
The state argued that its case is the “ideal 
vehicle” to resolve the question of whether 
such bans are legal because Utah’s 
governor, attorney general and a majority of 
its legislators are united in defending the 
law. State officials in Oklahoma and 
Virginia didn’t defend their bans that were 
found unconstitutional by federal appeals 
panels last month. 
“My responsibility is to defend the state 
constitution and its amendments as Utah 
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citizens have enacted them,” Utah Attorney 
General Sean Reyes, a Republican, said in 
an e-mailed statement. 
‘Majorities Overstep’ 
Shannon Minter, a lawyer who represents a 
gay couple in the Utah case, responded to 
the states’ rights argument by arguing that 
“courts have to step in and act as a check 
when majorities overstep and take rights 
away from vulnerable minorities.” 
“One of the most important roles that the 
courts play in our democracy is enforcing 
individual liberties, and the important 
principle of equal protection of the laws,” 
Minter said yesterday an interview. 
Utah’s request for the Supreme Court to 
weigh in comes at a time when public 
support for gay marriage is growing, 
reaching a new high of 55 percent in a 
Gallup poll conducted May 8-11. The 
nationwide poll, which had a margin of error 
of 4 percentage points, showed 42 percent 
opposed. 
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring 
said in a statement yesterday he will petition 
the Supreme Court Aug. 8 to review his 
state’s ban. Herring, a Democrat who took 
office in January refused to defend the ban 
before it was struck down by trial and 
appeals court judges, said he wants the final 
resolution from the high court as soon as 
possible. 
‘Final Word’ 
“I believe the district and appeals courts 
ruled correctly in striking down Virginia’s 
discriminatory marriage ban, but it has long 
been clear that the Supreme Court will likely 
have the final word,” he said. 
The Supreme Court could decide at its 
September conference to accept or reject 
either of the petitions from Utah and 
Virginia. Its next nine-month term starts in 
October. 
Despite all the momentum in lower courts to 
legalize gay marriage, several high court 
justices from the Windsor majority have 
signaled they aren’t especially eager to up 
the issue right away. 
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sonia 
Sotomayor suggested during arguments last 
year in a separate gay-rights case 
from California that it was too soon for a 
Supreme Court ruling on gay marriage. Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has hinted she has a similar 
view, saying the court moved too quickly in 
1973 when it legalized abortion nationwide. 
The Utah appeals court case is Kitchen v. 
Herbert. The Virginia case is Bostic v. 
Schaefer. 
  
591 
 
“10th Circuit Upholds Same-Sex Marriage” 
The Salt Lake Tribune 
Jessica Miller, Kristen Stewart, & Pamela Manson 
June 25, 2014 
A federal appeals court on Wednesday ruled 
that states outlawing same-sex marriage are 
in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 
By upholding a Utah judge’s decision, a 
three-member panel of the 10th Circuit 
Court of Appeals in Denver became the first 
appeals court in the nation to rule on the 
issue, setting a historic precedent that voter-
approved bans on same-sex marriage violate 
the Fourteenth Amendment rights of same-
sex couples to equal protection and due 
process. 
But the court immediately stayed the 
implementation of its decision, pending an 
anticipated appeal to the U.S. Supreme 
Court. 
Utah attorney general’s office said 
Wednesday it will initiate that appeal. 
Meanwhile, the state could ask the 10th 
Circuit Court to re-hear the matter before the 
full court. 
University of Utah law professor Clifford 
Rosky called Wednesday’s ruling, "the most 
important victory of the entire gay rights 
movement." 
It is the first time a federal appeals court has 
recognized that same-sex couples have the 
same fundamental right to marry as all 
Americans, said Rosky, chairman of 
Equality Utah’s board of directors. 
"Very few courts have embraced the 
fundamental rights argument and this court 
seems to have completely embraced it and 
applied ‘strict scrutiny,’ the highest standard 
recognized under constitutional law," Rosky 
said. 
If the state asks the 10th Circuit Court to re-
hear the matter before the full court of 12 
judges, Rosky said he doubts they will get a 
different result, and the request may not 
even be granted. 
The court’s two-to-one ruling affirms U.S. 
District Judge Robert Shelby’s December 
decision, which struck down Utah’s ban on 
same-sex marriage and prompted more than 
a 1,000 same-sex couples to marry during a 
17-day window before the U.S. Supreme 
Court issued a stay, halting all such 
weddings. 
Wednesday’s decision "certainly lends legal 
clarity at this stage," said Salt Lake County 
District Attorney Sim Gill. 
But it remains unclear what practical effect 
it will have, if any, Gill said. 
The state of Utah now has 90 days to ask the 
high court to weigh in, Gill said. The only 
way that counties would be free to 
immediately start issuing marriage licenses 
to same-sex couples would be if the state 
chooses not to petition the high court, he 
said. 
"The ball really goes back to the state of 
Utah," Gill said. 
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The Utah attorney general’s office released 
this statement Wednesday: "Although the 
Court’s 2-1 split decision does not favor the 
State, we are pleased that the ruling has been 
issued and takes us one step closer to 
reaching certainty and finality for all Utahns 
on such an important issue with a decision 
from the highest court. 
"For that to happen, the Utah Attorney 
General’s Office intends to file a Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit Court’s 
issuance of a stay will avoid further 
uncertainty until the case is finally resolved. 
Whether the Utah Attorney General’s Office 
seeks en banc [full court] review of the 
Tenth Circuit’s ruling has yet to be 
determined." 
Despite the continuing uncertainty, attorney 
Peggy Tomsic, who represented the three 
same-sex couples who are plaintiffs in the 
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit that is the subject 
of Wednesday’s decision, called the ruling 
"an absolute victory for fairness and 
equality" for the people of Utah and other 
states in the 10th Circuit. 
Plaintiff’s Moudi Sbeity and Derek Kitchen, 
had posted this Facebook comment: "Today 
is a great day for all that came before us, for 
all in the current trenches fighting for 
equality, and for all who are affected. 
"The 10th Circuit upheld Judge Shelby’s 
ruling, affirming that the right to marry and 
love is a right guaranteed to all Americans," 
the couple said. "Thank you all for the 
outpouring of love and support, and 
especially a huge thank you to our team and 
co-plaintiffs. Love on, Utah!" 
Many conservatives in Utah were 
disheartened by the ruling, but they have not 
given up in their fight to keep marriage 
between a man and a woman. 
Gov. Gary Herbert issued a statement saying 
he was “disappointed." 
"I believe states have the right to determine 
their laws regarding marriage. I am grateful 
the Court issued a stay to allow time to 
analyze the decision and our options. But as 
I have always said, all Utahns deserve 
clarity and finality regarding same-sex 
marriage and that will only come from the 
Supreme Court." 
Sen. Orrin Hatch made headlines recently by 
saying in May that it was almost a certainty 
that gay marriage will become legal. That 
said, he still expressed disappointment at the 
10th Circuit’s actions. 
"Although I am not surprised by today’s 
decision, I disagree with the court’s 
reasoning and hope the Supreme Court 
ultimately adheres to the original 
understanding of the Constitution and allow 
each state to define marriage for itself," he 
said. 
Rep. Rob Bishop, R-Utah, said, "Utahns 
have made clear their wishes on this subject 
and their wishes should not be superseded 
by a judge. Additionally, protecting the 1st 
Amendment and religious institutions’ rights 
and ability to uphold and act in accordance 
with their beliefs and principles must be a 
priority." 
The Sutherland Institute, a conservative 
think tank, promised to help gather a legal 
team to defend the state’s gay marriage ban. 
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"Any appeal at the U.S. Supreme Court is 
the main event and may decide the future of 
marriage for decades," according to a 
statement from Sutherland. "Defenders of 
marriage must be prepared. It’s 
disappointing to have a few federal judges 
decide that they can unilaterally override the 
decision of Utah voters to preserve marriage 
as society’s way of preserving children’s 
opportunity to be reared by a mother and 
father." 
The ruling affects all states in the 10th 
Circuit Court of Appeals: Colorado, Kansas, 
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and 
Wyoming. 
The court’s majority opinion focused on the 
14th Amendment, which gives equal 
protection to American citizens. The court 
said its reading of the Constitution shows 
that the legal rights of married couples has 
nothing to do with the gender of those in the 
union. 
"We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment 
protects the fundamental right to marry, 
establish a family, raise children, and enjoy 
the full protection of a state’s marital laws. 
A state may not deny the issuance of a 
marriage license to two persons, or refuse to 
recognize their marriage, based solely upon 
the sex of the persons in the marriage 
union," the appellate court said. 
"Courts do not sit in judgment of the hearts 
and minds of citizens." 
The majority judges attacked the state’s 
arguments, which centered largely around 
how same-sex marriage affects child-rearing 
and religious freedom. 
The judges wrote that the state’s arguments 
rested on a link between marriage and 
procreation — an argument that they said 
failed because opposite-sex couples who do 
not or cannot procreate are still allowed to 
marry. 
"Utah citizens may choose a spouse of the 
opposite sex regardless of the pairing’s 
procreative capacity," the opinion reads. 
"The elderly, those medically unable to 
conceive, and those who exercise their 
fundamental right not to have biological 
children are free to marry and have their out-
of-state marriages recognized in Utah, 
apparently without breaking the ‘conceptual 
link between marriage and procreation.’" 
The judges pointed out that the only 
reference to reproduction in Utah’s marriage 
law is a provision that allows first cousins to 
marry if they are over 65 years old or are 
over 55 and cannot reproduce. 
The judges also emphasized that religious 
leaders are still free to practice their 
sacraments and traditions as they see fit, and 
are not required to allow same-sex marriage 
in their churches. 
"We continue to recognize the right of the 
various religions to define marriage 
according to their moral, historical and 
ethical precepts," the opinion reads. "Our 
opinion does not intrude into that domain or 
the exercise of religious principles in this 
arena. The right of an officiant to perform or 
decline to perform a religious ceremony in 
unaffected by today’s ruling." 
Also Wednesday, a federal judge in 
Indianapolis struck down Indiana’s ban on 
same-sex marriage Wednesday, according to 
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the Associated Press. The ruling took effect 
immediately, allowing same-sex couples to 
marry. 
The 10th Circuit Court on Wednesday split 
along that same lines that were formed 
during oral arguments in April, with pointed 
questions asked by the three judges — Paul 
J. Kelly Jr., Carlos F. Lucero and Jerome A. 
Holmes — about marriage studies, 
jurisdiction and standard of scrutiny. 
At that time, Kelly — who was the 
dissenting judge in Wednesday’s opinion — 
had asked the plaintiffs’ attorney hard 
questions about state authority. 
Kelly on Wednesday disagreed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires Utah to 
extend marriage to same-sex couple or 
recognize those marriages from other states. 
He noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
recognized a fundamental right to marriage 
but said every decision vindicating that right 
has involved two opposite-gender people. 
"Indeed, the Court has been less than 
solicitous of plural marriages or polygamy," 
Kelly wrote. "If the States are the 
laboratories of democracy, requiring every 
state to recognize same-gender unions — 
contrary to the views of its electorate and 
representatives — [it] turns the notion of a 
limited national government on its head." 
Marriage does not exist in a vacuum and 
states have the right to regulate it, the judge 
said. He said Utah should prevail because 
the state has shown a rational basis for its 
decision — responsible procreation, 
effective parenting and the desire to proceed 
cautiously with a new social phenomenon. 
"Utah’s justifications for not extending 
marriage to include same-gender couples are 
not irrefutable. But they don’t need to be; 
they need only be based upon ‘any 
reasonably conceivable state of facts,’ " 
Kelly wrote. 
He also wrote, "We should resist the 
temptation to become philosopher-kings, 
imposing our views under the guise of 
constitutional interpretation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." 
During the April arguments in Denver, 
Tomsic had asked the judges to ensure 
marriage equality for all, while the state’s 
lead attorney, Gene C. Schaerr, asked them 
to preserve marriage rights only for 
opposite-sex couples. 
The state argued at that hearing that children 
benefit from being parented by a mother and 
a father, not two mothers or two fathers. 
But Tomsic also argued that the case is 
about family. She said couples want to 
provide for and protect each other legally, 
and children are demeaned and humiliated 
when their parents are unable to marry and 
provide them with the benefits and 
protections associated with the civil 
institution. 
Rosky called Wednesday’s ruling "a 
bipartisan decision," noting that Kelly was 
nominated to the bench by former President 
George H.W. Bush, Lucero was nominated 
in by former President Bill Clinton and 
Holmes was nominated by former President 
George W. Bush. 
Utah legislator Jim Dabakis, who is openly 
gay and was married during the brief time in 
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December when same-sex marriage in Utah 
was legal, said of the ruling: "I am joyous, 
as I know hundreds of thousands of LGBT 
folks and their families are, all across the 
great state of Utah. This is a pro-family 
decision and it fits squarely with true Utah 
family values — love, kindness and a fair 
playing field for all. It’s wonderful to see 
Utah, once again lead the country in gay 
rights." 
Salt Lake City Mayor Ralph Becker said, 
"This is a great day for the laws of the 
United States, but it still has a long way to 
go," noting that the 10th Circuit expects the 
Supreme Court to have the final say. 
The mayor, who helped marry gay couples 
in the hours after Judge Shelby’s ruling last 
December, noted that Utah’s key role in a 
legal process that may affect the entire 
nation. 
The state "is playing a leading role in one of 
the major issues in our day for social 
justice" Becker said. "For me, it is exciting." 
Evan Wolfson, president of Freedom to 
Marry, released a statement saying that 
ruling "has brought us one giant step closer 
to the day when all Americans will have the 
freedom to marry. This first federal 
appellate ruling affirms what more than 20 
other courts all across the country have 
found: There is no good reason to perpetuate 
unfair marriage discrimination any longer. 
America is ready for the freedom to marry, 
and it is time for the Supreme Court to bring 
our country to national resolution and it 
should do so now." 
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day 
Saints released a statement saying: "The 
Church has been consistent in its support of 
marriage between a man and a woman and 
teaches that all people should be treated with 
respect. In anticipation that the case will be 
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, it is 
our hope that the nation’s highest court will 
uphold traditional marriage." 
Meanwhile, a group called Mormons for 
Equality said many LDS Church members 
around the country were "celebrating 
today’s ruling as a positive step toward 
protecting more families and children in our 
society. 
"We appreciate in particular that the judges 
clearly addressed the distinction between the 
civil and religious marriage, and affirmed 
that ‘religious institutions remain as free as 
they always have been to practice their 
sacraments and traditions as they see fit.’ 
"This ruling confirms that civil marriage 
equality is not a question about religious 
beliefs or practices, but rather of what public 
policies will treat all members of our society 
fairly and protect the diverse families which 
exist in our communities." 
John Mejia, legal director of the American 
Civil Liberties Union of Utah, said in a news 
release, "This is a proud day for everybody 
in the state of Utah, and everybody across 
the country, who supports marriage 
equality." 
The ACLU had submitted a "friend of the 
court" brief in support of the plaintiffs in the 
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit. The ACLU also 
has filed a lawsuit in Utah federal court 
seeking recognition of the marriages of 
same-sex couples who were wed during the 
17-day period when they were legal. 
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The Democratic candidate for Utah attorney 
general, Charles Stormont, said that as 
attorney general, he would immediately drop 
the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, 
because it is "an enormous waste of money 
and we should be fighting to protect 
people’s rights, not to take them away. The 
state has no business dictating how people 
build their families, and the State should 
never tell children or their parents that they 
are second class citizens." 
Regarding the decision in Indiana, Rea 
Carey, Executive Director of the National 
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, said, "We are 
delighted that same-sex couples in the 
Hoosier State will now have the option of 
marriage. Marriage equality has clearly 
reached a critical mass and we can look 
forward to all Americans having the 
freedom to marry." 
 
